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INTRODUCTION 
In a speech delivered at the 2014 winter meeting of the National Association of 
Attorneys General, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder drew attention to a growing 
debate over the duty to defend statutes that an attorney general personally believes to 
be unconstitutional. According to Holder, state attorneys general may legitimately 
refuse to defend their states’ traditional definitions of marriage.1 Holder’s comments, 
coming three years after his announcement that the Justice Department would “enforce 
but not defend” the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), endorsed the practices 
of several state attorneys general who have refused to defend their state’s traditional 
definition of marriage (i.e., as being between one man and one woman).2 
                                                                                                                 
 
  Attorney General of Indiana; J.D., 1982, Indiana University Law School-
Bloomington. This article in its previous drafts was co-authored by Deputy Attorney General 
Jonathan R. Sichtermann. Special thanks to Mr. Sichtermann and Indiana Solicitor General 
Thomas M. Fisher for their assistance. Thanks also to Joe Stephens and the staff of the Indiana 
Law Journal for editing and publishing my Article. 
 1. Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Attorney 
General Eric Holder at the National Association of Attorneys General Winter Meeting, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 25, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches
/2014/ag-speech-1402251.html. 
 2. Currently the state attorneys general of California, Illinois, New Mexico, Nevada, 
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Kentucky have abandoned defense of 
their state’s marriage definition. Some of these states, such as California, have left no attorney 
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According to Holder, in deciding not to defend DOMA the Obama administration 
was “motivated by [its] strong belief that all measures that distinguish among people 
based on their sexual orientation must be subjected to a heightened standard of 
scrutiny—and, therefore, that [DOMA] was unconstitutional discrimination.”3 
Although conceding that decisions not to defend “must be exceedingly rare” and 
“reserved only for exceptional circumstances,” he explained that state attorneys 
general could refuse to defend marriage definitions because attorneys general “must 
be suspicious of legal classifications based solely on sexual orientation.”4 In a 
subsequent interview with the New York Times, Holder analogized today’s same-sex 
marriage cases to Brown v. Board of Education and explained that he would not have 
defended Kansas’s segregation statute if he had been the Kansas Attorney General 
in 1954, implying that state attorneys general should not defend their states’ marriage 
definitions either.5 Holder did not point to any legal authority to support his 
declarations in this unsolicited suggestion by a federal official to separately elected 
state officials, perhaps because countless attorneys general opinions and commentary 
at the state and federal levels support the opposite position: state attorneys general 
have a duty to defend state statutes against constitutional attack in all but the rarest 
circumstances, even when they personally view the statute to be unconstitutional. 
In a speech delivered at the annual Case Western Reserve School of Law Sumner 
Canary Lecture, Eleventh Circuit Judge and former Alabama Attorney General Bill 
Pryor echoed Holder’s sentiments regarding a selective, subjective nondefense of 
statutes. In his remarks, he argued that “executives” can appropriately engage in 
constitutional review, including attorneys general who are deciding whether to 
defend a challenged law. Pryor even opined that “the politics of the moment can help 
a state executive better interpret the constitution.”6 
Holder’s and Pryor’s statements attempt to justify decisions by several state 
attorneys general to abandon defense of their states’ marriage definitions. In addition 
to marriage definitions, attorneys general have on rare occasions also declined to 
defend portions of state immigration laws and state laws regulating the dissemination 
of marijuana-focused magazines.7 Each fact scenario is discussed in detail below, but 
from the following discussion, the attorney general’s duty to defend statutes in all 
but the most exceptional circumstances is clearly established, though its specific 
limits have been debated in recent years. 
                                                                                                                 
 
with standing to defend the statute. Others, such as Kentucky’s attorney general, initially 
defended the case at the trial court, but then abandoned defense on appeal and authorized the 
governor to maintain a defense using outside counsel. For a more thorough discussion of these 
states’ abandonment, see infra Part III.C. 
 3. Holder, supra note 1. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Matt Apuzzo, Holder Sees Way to Curb Bans on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES Feb. 25, 
2014, at A1. 
 6. Judge William H. Pryor, Speech at the Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law Sumner Canary Lecture: How the Separation of Powers Informs the Executive Duty to 
Defend the Law (Oct. 2, 2014), available at http://law.case.edu/Lectures.aspx?lec_id=376. 
 7. See infra Part III.A (discussing Indiana’s immigration statute); Part III.B (discussing 
Colorado’s marijuana statute). 
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This Article challenges Holder’s and Pryor’s views and explains the proper role 
of a state attorney general when a party challenges a state statute. In short, an attorney 
general owes the state and its citizens, as sovereign, a duty to defend its statutes 
against constitutional attack except when controlling precedent so overwhelmingly 
shows that the statute is unconstitutional that no good-faith argument can be made in 
its defense. To exercise discretion more broadly, and selectively to pick and choose 
which statutes to defend, only erodes the rule of law. 
This Article relies on state and federal court decisions and attorney general 
opinions to put the duty to defend in its proper context. It begins with a historical 
overview of the office of the attorney general, the rule of law, and an attorney 
general’s duty to defend,8 then analyzes the impacts an attorney general’s decision 
not to defend a statute has on the rule of law, separation of powers, and the adversarial 
justice system.9 The Article argues that an attorney general, whether of a state or of 
the United States, owes a duty to defend all statutes—even statutes that he or she 
personally opposes or finds distasteful—unless the only available defense is 
frivolous and devoid of good faith and therefore barred by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 and analogous state rules, or the statute infringes on executive power.10 
Next, the Article applies this framework to examples of nondefense in same-sex 
marriage and other cases to illustrate when attorneys general properly adhere to the 
duty to defend.11 The Article concludes by briefly examining the duty to defend as it 
applies to two ancillary practices: an attorney general’s decision to hire outside 
counsel and an attorney general’s opinion-writing function.12 
I. HISTORICAL VIEWS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DUTY TO DEFEND 
A. General Development of the Role of the Attorney General as it Relates 
to Development of the Rule of Law 
To understand the attorney general’s role as it exists today, it is important first to 
examine the office’s historical development. This Part reviews the office’s origins 
and development in England,13 then highlights several milestones in the development 
of colonial attorneys general,14 before briefly detailing the powers and duties held by 
state attorneys general today.15 Although the Article primarily addresses a state 
attorney general’s duty to defend, this Part also briefly outlines the development of 
the federal attorney general.16 
The role of the Attorney General of England can be traced through a 400-year 
period of English history culminating shortly after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. 
Originally, the Attorney General was the King’s representative in the courts and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. See infra Part I.A–C. 
 9. See infra Part I.D.1–3. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part III.A–C. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. See infra notes 17–27 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 28–32 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 37–50 and accompanying text. 
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represented only his interest.17 By the sixteenth century, the Attorney General served 
“as a liaison between the House of Lords and House of Commons”; but since the 
Attorney General was “an assistant to the Lords,” the office was not yet viewed as 
the legal representative of the entire Parliament that it is today.18 The Attorney 
General’s role again transformed when Sir Heneage Finch, a member of the House 
of Commons, became Attorney General in 1670.19 The Attorney General retained his 
seat in the House of Commons and “played an active role in presenting Commons’ 
cases to the Lords.”20 The following year, the Attorney General successfully resolved 
a legal dispute between the two houses of Parliament in Commons’ favor, and by the 
eighteenth century, the Attorney General had “evolved from an assistant to the Lords 
to an advocate for Commons as an elected [m]ember of parliament.”21 During the 
struggles between the King and Parliament, the Attorney General “formed part of the 
‘government,’ the ministerial group able to govern because it had the king’s confidence 
and the ability to control Parliament,”22 such that by the mid-eighteenth century, the 
Attorney General of England was not only the King’s legal advisor appearing on the 
King’s behalf in court, but also the legal advisor “to all departments of state.”23 The 
Attorney General of England’s role, therefore, was transformed from the King’s 
representative to the public official responsible for maintaining the rule of law.24 
An executive’s duty to defend statutes and constitutional provisions also 
developed during this same time period.25 The King of England initially retained the 
unilateral power to revoke acts of Parliament until this practice was declared 
unconstitutional in the late thirteenth century.26 The King continued to have the 
power to suspend acts of Parliament until 1688, when the King’s Bench declared the 
power unconstitutional, a ruling that was codified one year later in the 1689 Bill of 
Rights.27 The enactment of the English Bill of Rights, and specifically the provisions 
prohibiting royal powers to suspend and dispense with laws, was a significant 
milestone in the development of the rule of law. The development of the attorney 
general’s role as legal officer for the state, and specifically the development of his duty 
to defend, was also critical to the development of the rule of law. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. Emily Myers, Origin & Development of the Office, in STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
POWERS & RESPONSIBILITIES 2 (Emily Myers ed., 3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter Meyers, Origin 
& Development]. “[T]he lawyer who might lay claim to being the first attorney general was 
authorized to take legal action to protect state property, employees, and exercises of official 
discretion; to prosecute serious criminal cases; and to commence special investigations at the 
direction of state executive authority.” Id. 
 18. Id. at 3. 
 19. See id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 3–4. 
 24. Id. at 4. 
 25. For an in-depth examination of the development of the duty to defend in England, see 
Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal 
Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 869–72 (1994). 
 26. Id. at 870 n.10 (citing 2 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 308, 
437 (4th ed. 1936)). 
 27. Id. at 872. 
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The attorney general’s role continued to develop first in the prerevolutionary 
American colonies and then in the states.28 Many of a state attorney general’s current 
duties date back to early colonial times. For instance, by at least 1660, the Maryland 
colonial attorney general had the duty to defend government actions.29 As early as 
1708, the South Carolina attorney general was bringing collection actions on behalf 
of the governor against citizens who owed taxes.30 By the mid-eighteenth century, 
the opinion function of the attorney general had developed in North Carolina.31 
However, the attorney general’s role as chief legal officer for the colony, and later 
the state, was most clearly established in Pennsylvania, where the attorney general 
represented the governor but also had the power to oppose the governor or other 
appointed officials and provide legal advice to appointed officials which “tended to 
restrict rather than expand those officials’ powers or privileges and to confine them 
to the wishes of the people’s elected representatives.”32 
As a result of this gradual development, today the state attorney general 
unquestionably holds the title of “chief legal officer of the state,” vested with a 
mixture of common law, statutory, and constitutional powers and duties.33 
Among the duties entrusted to the state attorney general are the duty to advise 
the legislature on the constitutionality of proposed legislation;34 to advise the 
various executive agencies on the meaning of laws the agency is required to 
enforce and on the legality of various enforcement actions;35 to enforce certain 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. See Myers, Origin & Development, supra note 17, at 4–9 (outlining the office’s 
development in the American colonies and states). 
 29. Id. at 4. 
 30. Id. at 6. 
 31. Id. at 5. 
 32. Id. at 6. 
 33. Meyers, Origin & Development, supra note 17, at 45; see also, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 109.02 (LexisNexis 2014) (“The attorney general is the chief law officer for the state 
and all its departments.”); Michigan ex rel. Kelley v. C.R. Equip. Sales, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 
509, 513–14 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (noting the Michigan Attorney General’s common law and 
statutory powers); Amemiya v. Sapienza, 629 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Haw. 1981) (“The attorney 
general is without question the chief legal officer of the State.”); EPA v. Pollution Control 
Bd., 372 N.E.2d 50, 51–52 (Ill. 1977) (noting that as the state’s chief legal officer, the Illinois 
Attorney General possesses common law powers that cannot be limited by the legislature or 
the judiciary); Fieger v. Cox, 734 N.W.2d 602, 611 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007); William P. 
Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from 
the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2456–57 (2006) (citing Ex parte Weaver, 570 So. 
2d 675, 684 (Ala. 1990)) (explaining that an attorney general possesses both statutory and 
common law powers). 
 34. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-31-101(b) (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-125 (2007); 
FLA. STAT. § 16.01(3) (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-704 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.13 
(LexisNexis 2014); Henry J. Abraham & Robert R. Benedetti, The State Attorney General: A 
Friend of the Court?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 798 (1969); Emily Myers, Status in State 
Government, in STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL POWERS & RESPONSIBILITIES 68 (Emily Myers ed., 
3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter Myers, Status in State Government]. 
 35. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-31-101(b) (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-125 (2007); 
FLA. STAT. § 16.01(3) (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-704 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 109.12 (LexisNexis 2014); Abraham & Benedetti, supra note 34 at 798; Emily Myers & 
Andy Bennett, Opinions, in STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL POWERS & RESPONSIBILITIES 74–75 
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statutes;36 and, most relevant to this Article, to defend state statutes and 
constitutional provisions against constitutional challenges. 
In drafting the U.S. Constitution, the Founders drew heavily from the 
developments both in England and in the colonies and vested the unitary federal 
executive with powers and limitations similar to those that existed both in England 
and in the states.37 The Founders, well aware of what was to them a new development 
in the executive-legislative division of power, wanted to ensure that the President 
could not acquire the suspension powers recently wrested from the King by 
Parliament and the English judiciary.38 In drafting the “Take Care Clause,” the 
                                                                                                                 
 
(Emily Myers ed., 3d ed. 2013). 
 36. Dennis Cuevas, Consumer Protection, in STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL POWERS 
& RESPONSIBILITIES 238–45 (Emily Myers ed., 3d ed. 2013); John J. Watkins, Adventures in 
FOIA Land, 1999 ARK. L. NOTES 111, 119 n.100 (2012) (noting that Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Texas, and Wisconsin provide enforcement 
authority for their states’ attorneys general); Amy Widman & Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys 
General’s Use of Concurrent Public Enforcement Authority in Federal Consumer Protection 
Laws, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 53 (2011) (“Currently, twenty-four federal laws explicitly 
provide for concurrent federal and state public enforcement authority.”). It is important to note 
that in the divided state executive branch, the office of the attorney general does not have the 
power to enforce most statutes; that duty rests with the various agencies. Instead, the duty to 
enforce statutes rests with the attorney general only in limited circumstances, such as telephone 
privacy, consumer protection, and legislation enacted pursuant to the Tobacco Master Settlement 
Agreement. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 24-5-0.5-4(c) (2006) (allowing the Indiana Attorney General 
to enforce Indiana’s consumer protection statutes); IND. CODE § 24-4.7-5-2 (2006) (allowing the 
Indiana Attorney General to enforce Indiana’s telephone privacy statutes); IND. CODE § 24-3-5.4 
(2006). Congress occasionally enacts legislation enforceable by state attorneys general as well. 
See, e.g., Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227(g) (2012); Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 37. May, supra note 25, at 883. The term “unitary federal executive” is used throughout 
this Article to refer to the President’s power to appoint, remove, and direct the actions of the 
U.S. Attorney General, and other cabinet officials, and to distinguish the federal governmental 
structure from the state governmental structure in which nearly all attorneys general are 
independent from the governor and not susceptible to the governor’s control. The precise 
scope of the unitary federal executive theory, which has been the subject of extensive scholarly 
debate for decades, is beyond the scope of this article. For this Article’s purposes, it is 
sufficient to understand that the U.S. Attorney General reports to the President and carries out 
the President’s preferred legal strategy, while most state attorneys general are separately 
elected and do not report to the governor and implement their own legal policy. 
 38. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 
381, 409 (“Commentators generally agree that at least one purpose of the clause was to make 
it clear the president cannot arbitrarily suspend the enforcement of laws enacted by 
Congress.”) (citing Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 583–84 (1994)); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, 
The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1313 (1996) 
(“[T]he most important, if not the sole, aspect of this limitation is to make clear that ‘the 
executive Power’ does not include a power analogous to a royal prerogative of suspension.”); 
May, supra note 25, at 873–74 (“[The take care clause] means that the President may not—
whether by revocation, suspension, dispensation, inaction, or otherwise—fail to honor and 
enforce statutes to which he or his predecessors have assented, or which may have been 
enacted over his objection.”). The Founders included the Take Care Clause in order to “counter 
2015] DUTY TO DEFEND 519 
 
Founders looked to well-respected authorities like Montesquieu, who explained in 
his Spirit of the Laws that “when, in a popular government, there is a suspension of 
the laws, as this can proceed only from the corruption of the republic, the state is 
certainly undone.”39 To ensure that did not happen, the Founders included the Take 
Care Clause in the Constitution, which required the President to faithfully execute 
laws passed by Congress.40 
To be sure, the Take Care Clause does not explicitly mandate a duty to defend 
congressional statutes, and it is important to account for the distinction between a 
duty to defend the law from the duty to enforce. An executive’s duty to enforce arises 
at all times because the executive is charged with enforcing the statute.41 As a result, 
one administration’s choice not to enforce a statute does not prevent a subsequent 
administration from enforcing the statute. Conversely, the duty to defend arises only 
when a party challenges a statute’s constitutionality in court, because “a statute’s 
legitimacy can only be challenged on a constitutional basis.”42 When a plaintiff 
challenges a statute on other grounds—for instance, by alleging that a statute is 
superseded by a more recent statute or conflicts with a different statute—the plaintiff 
is merely challenging the statute’s interpretation, not its underlying validity.43 As 
discussed in greater detail later, an executive who fails to adhere to the duty to defend 
erodes the rule of law to a greater extent than one who fails to adhere to the duty to 
enforce, because failure to defend can result in binding legal precedent declaring the 
statute unconstitutional.44 
Regardless, the prevailing opinion at the Founding was that the federal executive 
owed a duty to defend statutes even if the executive believed them to be 
                                                                                                                 
 
not only centuries of English history, but also the writings of John Locke,” who argued that 
the executive possessed the prerogative to act according to the executive’s discretion even if 
it meant acting without the force of law or against the law. Bales, supra note 38, at 409 n.215 
(citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 160 (1689)). 
 39. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 38 (1748) 
(Thomas Nugent trans., Batoche Books 2001) (1752). 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. President Washington, in discussing the Whiskey Rebellion, 
explained that it was his “duty to see the Laws executed: to permit them to be trampled upon 
with impunity would be repugnant to” that duty. Letter from George Washington to Alexander 
Hamilton (Sept. 7, 1792), available at http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/lessons
/washington/hamilton2.html; see also Curt A. Levey & Kenneth A. Klukowski, Take Care Now: 
Stare Decisis & the President’s Duty to Defend Acts of Congress, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 377, 
389 (2014) (“As Justice James Wilson, who was instrumental in drafting the Take Care Clause, 
explained, the President has ‘authority, not to make, or alter, or dispense with the laws, but to 
execute and act the laws, which [are] established.’”); May, supra note 25, at 873–74 (“The duty to 
execute the laws faithfully means that the President may not—whether by revocation, suspension, 
dispensation, inaction, or otherwise—fail to honor and enforce statutes to which he or his 
predecessors have assented, or which may have been enacted over his objection.”). 
 41. Levey & Klukowski, supra note 40, at 386. 
 42. Id. at 384. 
 43. See id. (citing Carlos E. Gonzalez, The Logic of Legal Conflict: The Perplexing 
Combination of Formalism and Anti-Formalism in Adjudication of Conflicting Legal Norms, 
80 OR. L. REV. 447, 453 (2001)). 
 44. See infra notes 139–40 and accompanying text (comparing the impact of abandoning 
the duty to defend with the impact of abandoning the duty to enforce). 
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unconstitutional.45 The Founders enshrined this duty in the Constitution through the Take 
Care Clause which, when read in its historical context, “is a succinct and all-inclusive 
command through which the Framers sought to prevent the Executive from resorting to 
the panoply of devices employed by English kings to evade the will of Parliament.”46 
The Founders provided the President with an opportunity to determine a bill’s 
constitutionality, but that occurs before signing it into law. The President has the duty 
to determine a bill’s constitutionality when it is presented for signing, and can veto 
unconstitutional bills.47 At this point, and only this point, the President has the ability 
to review a statute’s constitutionality de novo.48 The Founders provided the veto 
power in part to ensure that the President could defend the powers delegated to the 
executive branch by the Constitution against infringement from the other two 
branches.49 Indeed, President Washington, on the advice of James Madison (the 
principal drafter of the Constitution), refused to veto bills that were not clearly 
unconstitutional based on the belief that such a power should be reserved only for 
those bills that violated the Constitution.50 Although subsequent Presidents have not 
used their veto power so sparingly, constitutional analysis remains one of the key 
reasons for vetoing a bill. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. Cf. May, supra note 25, at 873–74 (explaining that the Founders drafted the Take Care 
Clause to ensure that the President adhered to the duty to enforce); Levey & Klukowski, supra 
note 40, at 385–86 (explaining that historically, the duty to defend has been viewed as part of 
the duty to enforce). 
 46. Id. at 873. 
 47. John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A 
Normative, Descriptive, & Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 378 (1993) 
(citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton)); JAMES MADISON, Observations on the 
“Draught of a Constitution for Virginia,” in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 292–93 (Robert 
A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson, eds. 1977); Michael B. Rappaport, The President’s Veto 
& the Constitution, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 735, 771–76 (1993)); Levey & Klukowski, supra note 
40, at 395 (“[I]f a President regards legislation before him as unconstitutional, then his veto is 
the means the Constitution gives him to express that view.”). The other two branches each 
have their own role to play in determining a statute’s constitutionality as well. Congress’s duty 
also comes before the bill becomes law—both houses of Congress must ensure that bills they 
pass are constitutional. See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of 
Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707, 719 (1985) (citing the Congressional Oath Clause) (discussing 
Congress’s duty). Postenactment, the federal court system must determine whether challenged 
statutes are constitutional. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[T]he federal 
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.” (emphasis added)); see 
also David A. Weinstein, Rutgers v. Waddington: Alexander Hamilton and the Birth Pangs of 
Judicial Review, 9 JUD. NOTICE 26, 27 n.2 (2013) (noting the development of judicial review 
in state court systems). 
 48. Levey & Klukowski, supra note 40, at 394. 
 49. Id. at 395 (citing The Att’y Gen.'s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally 
Objectionable Legislation, 4A Op. O.L.C. 55, 58 (1980)). 
 50. STUART LEIBIGER, FOUNDING FRIENDSHIP: GEORGE WASHINGTON, JAMES MADISON, AND 
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 136 (1999); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 907–08 (1989) (listing other early Presidents 
who vetoed bills on constitutional grounds, and noting that Andrew Jackson’s veto of the Bank 
Bill was controversial because he vetoed for reasons other than constitutionality). 
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B. The Duty to Defend at the Federal Level 
As early as 1806, the courts were grappling with the limits of the President’s 
ability to enforce federal statutes selectively. For instance, in United States v. Smith, 
the Circuit Court for the District of New York explained that if the President could 
refuse to enforce a statute (or allow a person to violate the statute), “it would render 
the execution of the laws dependent on his will and pleasure[,] which” has no support 
in the federal constitutional system.51 
These views continued to dominate at the federal level into the twentieth century 
in the form of federal attorney general opinions and Office of Legal Counsel 
opinions. In 1937, the U.S. Attorney General issued an opinion that established the 
federal executive’s duty to enforce, and not question the constitutionality of, federal 
statutes.52 The opinion explained that rarely would it be proper for the Attorney 
General to question a statute’s constitutionality because “it is not within the province 
of the Attorney General to declare an act of the Congress unconstitutional.”53 
Although these early cases and opinions explicitly addressed the duty to enforce, it 
appears as though the two duties were viewed as one single duty, with the duty to 
defend a statute comprising part of the President’s overall duty to enforce it.54 
More recently, U.S. Attorneys General in both Democrat and Republican 
administrations have articulated the duty to defend congressional legislation against 
constitutional challenges. In 1976, Assistant Attorney General Rex Lee testified that 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) would defend federal statutes unless the statutes were 
“so patently unconstitutional that [they] cannot be defended”—a situation that he 
termed “thankfully most rare.”55 In 1980, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti issued 
an opinion explaining that “[t]he Attorney General has a duty to defend and enforce 
both the Acts of Congress and the Constitution.”56 Civiletti acknowledged that these 
duties could conflict and explained that when they do, “it is almost always the case that 
[the Attorney General] can best discharge the responsibilities of his office by defending 
and enforcing the Act of Congress.”57 This opinion “concur[red] fully in the view 
expressed by nearly all of [Civiletti’s] predecessors.”58 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342). In 
Smith, which addressed the Neutrality Acts, the court explained that the President lacked the 
power to control or “dispense with [the Acts’] execution.” Note, Executive Discretion and the 
Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE L.J. 970, 972 n.6 (1983) [hereinafter Executive 
Discretion] (quoting Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1230). 
 52. Rendition of Opinions on Constitutionality of Statutes—Fed. Home Loan Bank Act, 
39 Op. Att’y Gen. 11 (1937). 
 53. Id. The opinion qualified this statement by explaining that the President may decline 
to enforce a statute that “involve[s] conflict between the prerogatives of the legislative and 
executive departments.” See id. 
 54. Levey & Klukowski, supra note 40, at 385–86. 
 55. Representation of Congress & Congressional Interests in Court: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on the Separation of Powers of the S. Comm on the Jud., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 
(1976) (statement of Rex Lee, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
 56. The Att’y Gen.’s Duty to Defend & Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable 
Legislation, 4A Op. O.L.C. 55, 55 (1980). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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According to Civiletti, refusing to defend a statute would upset the delicate 
balance of powers among the three coordinate branches of the federal government:59 
While the judicial branch “protect[s] both the government and the citizenry from 
unconstitutional [legislative and executive] actions,” the executive branch is the only 
one with the power to defend the statutes.60 Therefore, attorneys general who 
“ignor[e] or attack[] [a]cts of Congress whenever they believed them to be in conflict 
with the provisions of the Constitution, . . . could jeopardize the equilibrium 
established within our constitutional system.”61 
In making his argument, Civiletti analogized an arguably unconstitutional law to an 
unconstitutional or illegal injunction. In order to preserve the integrity of the judicial 
process, all parties are bound by such an injunction until it is modified or dissolved on 
appeal.62 Similarly, in order to preserve the adversarial judicial process, the government 
must defend a statute until the Supreme Court declares it unconstitutional.63 
The following year, Attorney General William French Smith echoed his Democratic 
predecessor’s opinion when he explained that the Attorney General may decline to 
defend an act only “in the rare case when the statute either infringes on the 
constitutional power of the Executive or when prior precedent overwhelmingly 
indicates that the statute is invalid.”64 Otherwise, the Attorney General “has the duty to 
defend an act of Congress whenever a reasonable argument can be made in its support, 
even if the Attorney General and the lawyers examining the case conclude that the 
argument may ultimately be unsuccessful in the courts.”65 
Most recently, Attorney General John Ashcroft explained that the duty to defend 
acts of Congress extends even to situations in which the attorney general personally 
disagrees with the challenged law.66 According to Ashcroft, “the proper role of an 
officer of the executive branch” is to defend the interests of the federal government 
                                                                                                                 
 
 59. See id. at 55–56  
 60. Id. at 56. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at n.1 (citing Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967)). Civiletti 
explained that the injunction at issue in Walker was not “transparently invalid” and that if a 
statute is “‘transparently invalid’ when viewed in light of established constitutional law,” the 
President should not enforce and defend it. Id. (emphasis added). 
 63. See id. at 55–56. 
 64. The Att’y Gen.’s Duty to Defend the Constitutionality of Statutes, 5 Op. O.L.C. 25 
(1981) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972); 
Furda v. State, 1 A.3d 528 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); Bd. of Treasurers. of Cmty. Coll. v. 
Cool Cnty. Teachers, 356 N.E.2d 1089 (Ill. Ct. App. 1976). This rule only applies in the 
judicial context, however, Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 510, because the judicial branch is the 
weakest branch, having neither Congress’s power of the purse nor the President’s power of 
the sword. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Indeed, “disobedience to the statute 
may be the only means of obtaining judicial determination of its constitutionality.” Dickinson, 
465 F.2d at 510. 
 65. The Att’y Gen.’s Duty to Defend the Constitutionality of Statutes, 5 Op. O.L.C. 25, 
25–26 (1981). 
 66. John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks at the Federalist Society 20th 
Anniversary Gala (Nov. 14, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/archive
/ag/speeches/2002/111402finalfederalistsociety.htm). 
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and statutes passed by Congress even if those officers do not believe that the statutes 
are “the best view of the law, or what it should be.”67 
A 1994 opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) articulated a narrower 
view of the President’s duties. In the opinion, OLC advised that the President should 
exercise independent judgment to decide whether to enforce a statute that “appears 
to conflict with the constitution,” giving deference to Congress, which believed it 
was passing constitutional legislation.68 According to OLC, when the Attorney 
General concludes both that a statute is unconstitutional and that a court would 
invalidate it, the President should refuse to enforce the statute.69 This OLC opinion 
addresses the duty to enforce, but because enforcement decisions are made by a 
unitary federal executive, historically the executive branch has defended a statute 
when it is enforced unless the statute infringes on executive powers70—a situation 
discussed in detail later.71 OLC cited Supreme Court cases,72 as well as various 
presidential signing statements, attorney general opinions, and other historical 
materials, which it termed “consistent and substantial executive practice.”73 These 
“consistent” examples dealt with statutes that impeded the proper functions of the 
executive.74 Although the OLC opinion explicitly addressed the duty to enforce, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 
199, 200 (1994) (emphasis added). It should also be noted that the Carter Justice Department did 
not defend the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 in League of Women Voters v. FCC on the ground 
that it violated citizens’ First Amendment rights, Executive Discretion, supra note 51, at 974–75, 
but on rehearing, the Reagan Justice Department defended the statute. The Att’y Gen.’s Duty to 
Defend the Constitutionality of Statutes, 5 Op. O.L.C. 25 (1981). 
 69. Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 
199, 205 (1994). 
 70. See, e.g., id. at 210 (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); INS v. Chadha, 
462 U.S. 919 (1983); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946)). In two recent instances, 
Presidents have expanded the “enforce but not defend” practice to statutes that do not infringe 
on their powers. See Levey & Klukowski, supra note 40, at 406 (noting only two instances in 
which a President announced that he would enforce a statute but not defend it: President 
Obama with DOMA and President Clinton with “a 1996 law discharging HIV-positive service 
members from the military”). 
 71. See infra Part I.D.4. 
 72. Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 
199 (1994) (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)). 
 73. Id. (citing Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 462–70 (1860)). 
 74. Id. at 209–11 (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654 (1988); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 
303 (1946); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Lear Siegler, Inc., Energy Prods. Div. 
v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988)). The opinion also cites various presidential signing 
statements, attorney general opinions, and other historical materials. These documents all deal 
with some mechanism that encroaches on the executive’s authority generally, and specifically, 
most deal with the legislative veto. The others deal with statutes that appoint officers to 
executive agencies, limit the President’s power to remove appointments to executive agencies, 
require the President to terminate provisions in certain treaties, condition executive actions on 
the approval of a congressional committee, and require one-third of the members of an 
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drafter appears to have treated the enforcement and defense duties as synonymous 
because its appendix cites several cases where the President either enforced the 
statute and then later challenged its constitutionality in subsequent litigation or 
refused to enforce and defend the statute.75 
Therefore, to the extent that the 1994 OLC opinion addresses the duty to defend, 
it can be reconciled with the 1980 opinion because the 1994 opinion dealt only with 
a subset of the statutes addressed in the 1980 opinion. The 1994 opinion applies only 
to statutes that infringe on the President’s executive authority.76 In such situations, 
the President could refuse to enforce, and refuse to defend, the statute even though 
the statute was not clearly unconstitutional. When statutes do not infringe on the 
executive’s constitutional authorities, the 1980 opinion controls and the President 
must defend them in the face of constitutional challenges. 
C. The Duty to Defend at the State Level 
Like the federal attorney general, state attorneys general owe a duty to defend 
state statutes against constitutional challenges.77 To prevail on a constitutional 
                                                                                                                 
 
executive board to be chosen by the Speaker of the House and another one-third by the Senate 
Majority Leader. Id. 
 75. See id. (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (enforcing but refusing to 
defend); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (enforcing but refusing to defend); United States 
v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (enforcing but refusing to defend); Myers v. United States, 272 
U.S. 52 (1926) (refusing to enforce and defend)). 
 76. See Levey & Klukowski, supra note 40, at 408. In such situations, the President 
should be given more latitude to determine a statute is not constitutional because “typically . . . 
only the President . . . can challenge the law.” Id. 
 77. See, e.g., Ariz. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 78-10 (Jan. 26, 1978) (explaining that the office 
would only conclude that a statute was unconstitutional in “the most clear and compelling 
circumstances” because of the office’s duty to defend all statutes and because of the 
presumption of constitutionality); Idaho Att’y Gen. Op. No. 98-1 (1998) (explaining that “the 
Attorney General has a duty to defend the state statutes” upon which the Supreme Court has 
not ruled); La. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 97-361 (Aug. 20, 1997) (“[I]t is the policy of the Attorney 
General’s office to refrain from opining whether an [sic] statute is constitutional inasmuch as 
the Attorney General is charged with defending the constitutionality of all legislative statutes.” 
(emphasis added)); Code Revision—Whether 1964 Statute Prohibiting Receipt of 
Remuneration for Participation in a “Racial Demonstration” is Constitutional, 93 Md. Att’y 
Gen. Op. 154 (2008) (“[W]e are mindful of the obligation of the Attorney General to defend, 
in litigation, the constitutionality of statutes enacted by the Legislature.”); Mo. Att’y Gen. Op. 
No. 89-81 (1981) (noting the office “ha[d] no authority to declare a statute invalid”); Or. Att’y 
Gen. Op. No. OP-6500 n.3 (Oct. 15, 1993) (“It is our duty to defend the constitutionality of a 
statute unless no argument worthy of the court’s consideration can be made in its behalf.”) 
(emphasis added) (citing 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 377, 380 n.2 (1982)); 53–55 Wash. Att’y Gen. 
Op. No. 310 (1954) (noting that statutes have a strong presumption of constitutionality and 
that the office has a duty to defend the statute “[u]nless the invalidity . . . is apparent”); Letter 
from Robert K. Killian, Att’y Gen., Conn., to Mati Koiva, Deputy Comm’r, Conn. Motor 
Vehicle Dep’t. (May 23, 1973), available at 1973 WL 25973 (refusing to opine on the statute’s 
constitutionality because “such issues should be decided by the Courts and . . . it is the duty of 
the Attorney General’s Office to defend the constitutionality of all statutes” (emphasis 
added)); Letter from Daniel R. McLeod, Att’y Gen., S.C., to Mrs. Harold A. Moore (Jan. 29, 
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challenge, the plaintiff must prove that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt.78 It is the attorney general’s duty to defend, not overcome, this 
                                                                                                                 
 
1968), available at 1968 WL 12900 (“Whether the statute is good or bad is beside the point in 
that such a determination is a legislative matter, and if the Legislature acts, it is my duty to 
attempt to support its position.”); Letter from Robert M. Spire, Att’y Gen., Neb., to Sen. Chris 
Beutler (Dec. 20, 1985) available at 1985 WL 168642 (“This office is required by law to 
defend existing statutes, or any interpretation and application of these statutes by the executive 
branch of government, if challenged in a court of law.”). State courts have also recognized a 
broad mandatory duty to defend. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, for instance, held that “the 
attorney general must defend the constitutionality of . . . statutes.” State v. City of Oak Creek, 
605 N.W.2d 526, 536 (Wis. 2000) (emphasis added). According to the court, if the attorney 
general challenged the constitutionality of a state statute, such a challenge “would conflict 
with his duty to defend.” Id. Likewise, the Maryland Supreme Court held that “under the 
Constitution and statutes of Maryland the Attorney General ordinarily has the duty of 
appearing in the courts as the defender of the validity of enactments.” State ex rel. Att’y Gen. 
v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 481 A.2d 785, 799 (Md. 1984). Finally, the New York Attorney 
General declined to issue an opinion on the constitutionality of a law in part because of the 
office’s duty to defend state statutes against constitutional challenge. 1981 N.Y. Att’y Gen. 
Op. 235, 236 (1981). 
 78. See, e.g., Mo. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 94-81 (Mar. 6, 1981); Barber v. Jefferson Cnty. 
Racing Ass’n, 960 So. 2d 599, 615 (Ala. 2006) (“In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, 
we approach the question with every presumption and intendment in favor of its validity, and 
seek to sustain rather than strike down the enactment of a coordinate branch of the government. 
Overcoming that presumption is a heavy burden, which is borne by the party challenging the 
validity of the statute.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); People v. Ford, 
773 P.2d 1059, 1062 (Colo. 1989) (“[A] statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the party 
attacking the statute has the burden of proving it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”); State v. Keene, 629 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Iowa 2001) (explaining that all statutes are 
presumed constitutional and, to overcome the “heavy burden” borne by a challenger, the 
challenger “must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the statute’s unconstitutionality” by 
“refut[ing] every reasonable basis upon which the statute could be found to be constitutional”); 
LaFournaise v. Montana Developmental Ctr., 77 P.3d 202, 206 (Mont. 2003) (“Statutes are 
presumed to be constitutional. A person challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears a 
heavy burden of proving the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.”); In re 
Termination of Parental Rights to Diana P., 694 N.W.2d 344, 350 (Wis. 2005) (“A party 
challenging a statute’s constitutionality bears a heavy burden to overcome the presumption of 
constitutionality. Therefore, it is insufficient for the party challenging the statute to establish 
either that the statute’s constitutionality is doubtful or that the statute is probably 
unconstitutional. Instead, a party challenging a statute’s constitutionality must demonstrate 
that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (citations omitted); Manigault 
v. State, 881 N.E.2d 679, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“In considering a constitutional challenge 
to a statute, we presume that the statute is valid and place a heavy burden on the challenger, 
who must clearly overcome that presumption. All reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor 
of the statute's constitutionality.”); Commc’ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. State, 22 A.3d 
170, 179 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2011) (“When faced with a constitutional challenge, a 
statute is presumed constitutional. To overcome this presumption, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that there are no conceivable grounds to support its validity.); Bobka v. Town of 
Huntington, 532 N.Y.S.2d 561, 562 (N.Y App. Div. 1988) (“In challenging the 
constitutionality of Chapter 149, the plaintiffs face a heavy burden. Statutes are presumed to 
be constitutional, and that presumption can only be rebutted by proof beyond a reasonable 
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presumption.79 The South Carolina attorney general has explained that whether attorneys 
general believe a law to be “good policy” is irrelevant because such considerations are 
for the legislature to make; the attorney general must defend the statute.80 
In recent decades, attorneys general have used a variety of (ultimately unhelpful) 
terms to describe when a statute is indefensible, such as “manifestly invalid”;81 “most 
clear and compelling circumstances”;82 “no argument worthy of the court’s 
consideration”;83 or “patently illegal or unconstitutional.”84 This Article collectively 
refers to these as the “clearly unconstitutional” standard. Following this standard, 
attorneys general have refused to defend statutes only when “a court of competent 
jurisdiction” has issued an opinion directly on point.85 Attorneys general applying 
the “clearly unconstitutional” standard have explained that abandoning a defense in 
situations when no Supreme Court precedent dictates that a defense would be 
frivolous leads to one of two unacceptable outcomes—either “an [a]ttorney [g]eneral 
who is a political rubber stamp or one who is a political spokesman for political 
opposition to the [g]overnor.”86  My concern, explained in more detail in Part III.C., 
below, is that a nominal “clearly unconstitutional” standard is too easily manipulated 
by political opportunists. 
It is certainly the case that, throughout history, adhering to a duty to defend a 
statute not already directly invalidated has put state attorneys general in awkward, 
highly undesirable positions. But fealty to the rule of law can require attorneys 
general to do just that.  In Brown v. Board of Education, for example, the Kansas 
Attorney General and his team were put in the difficult position of defending 
educational segregation decisions that they knew to be morally and constitutionally 
objectionable and offensive, yet they were compelled to defend the law anyway 
according to their understanding of their roles and obligations. In Brown, the Kansas 
Attorney General had often criticized school segregation as being “morally, 
politically, and economically indefensible,”87 yet he chose to defend the statute 
                                                                                                                 
 
doubt.”); Grimaud v. Pennsylvania Ins. Dep’t, 995 A.2d 391, 407 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (“In 
order to succeed on this argument, [the challenger] must overcome the strong presumption that 
legislative enactments . . . do not violate the Constitution. The burden to overcome the 
presumption is heavy: ‘[A] statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, 
palpably, and plainly violated the Constitution [and a]ll doubts are to be resolved in favor of 
finding that the legislative enactment passes constitutional muster.’” (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877 
A.2d 383, 393 (2005)). 
 79. See Mo. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 94-81. 
 80. See, e.g., Letter from Daniel R. McLeod to Mrs. Harold A. Moore, supra note 77 
(“Whether the statute is good or bad is beside the point in that such a determination is a legislative 
matter, and if the Legislature acts, it is my duty to attempt to support its position.”). 
 81. Letter from Daniel R. McLeod to Mrs. Harold A. Moore, supra note 77. 
 82. Ariz. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 78-10 (1978). 
 83. Or. Att’y Gen. Op. No. OP-6500 n.3 (Oct. 15, 1993), available at 1993 WL 437896. 
 84. Letter from David Souter, Attorney General, New Hampshire, to Robert A. Backus 
(Mar. 30, 1978) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal). 
 85. See Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 2001-087; 1998 Idaho Att’y Gen. Op. 5, 4 (1998). 
 86. Letter from David Souter to Robert Backus, supra note 84. 
 87. PAUL E. WILSON, A TIME TO LOSE: REPRESENTING KANSAS IN BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION 112 (1995). 
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expressly because it was his office’s duty to “defend the validity of a Kansas statute 
that was constitutional under all of the law we then knew or could know.”88 
Similarly, the attorney assigned to argue Brown before the Supreme Court in 1954 
was also personally opposed to segregation but he “was not a legislator, nor . . . an 
individual seeking to implement [his] personal moral standards”; rather, he was “a 
lawyer committed to uphold the law and the adversary process.”89 He believed that 
his job was to present the arguments that supported the State’s position under the rule 
of law that existed at that time so that the Court could make an informed decision 
after hearing both sides.90 He concluded that a “lawyer who has been faithful to his 
responsibility [to present his client’s arguments] will have made a useful contribution 
to the result” even if that attorney is on the losing side.91 In short, the Kansas Attorney 
General and his team did not shirk from their duty to defend their client, the Kansas 
statute, just because they were aware it was a bad law or because they feared being 
on the “wrong side of history.” 
Clearly we do not mean to suggest a cavalier position with regard to the defense 
of segregation laws—which everyone today recognizes were a grave injustice—but 
using Brown as a case study is particularly useful precisely because no responsible 
lawyer today can imagine a Fourteenth Amendment that would permit racial 
segregation anywhere. The duty to defend underscores the requirement that for those 
who aspire to become a state (or federal) attorney general, to do the job properly they 
must be prepared to defend the state’s most controversial laws from constitutional 
challenge, even if they do not personally believe those laws to be constitutional.92 
Those who are not prepared to mount such a defense and fulfil their duty should 
neither seek nor accept the office. Running for the office precisely so one can choose 
not to defend laws one dislikes is a particularly dishonorable course.93 In suggesting 
a selective, subjective nondefense, Eric Holder said in February of 2014 that if he 
had been Kansas Attorney General in 1954, he would not have defended segregation. 
In view of the duty to defend, our analysis is slightly different. Knowing that 
segregation was a fundamental and controversial regulatory institution being 
subjected to (or likely to be subjected to) constitutional attack and that the challenge 
should be properly allowed to run its course, I never would have entertained the idea 
of becoming Kansas Attorney General at all in an elected or appointed capacity in 
the early 1950s. I would not have run for or sought such an office, knowing I would 
have to in court defend a law I so strongly disagreed with. The duty to defend that 
statute—odious and offensive as that law was, in hindsight—was intrinsic to the job 
description for the officeholder who served as State’s lawyer in 1954. To put it 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 100. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 101. 
 92. See Jacob Fenston, Cuccinelli Blasts Herring for Not Defending Virginia Gay 
Marriage Ban, WAMU 88.5 (Mar. 16, 2014), http://wamu.org/news/14/03/16/cuccinelli
_blasts_herring_for_not_defending_virginia_gay_marriage_ban (“As attorney general, he 
says, voters have hired you to defend state laws whether you like those laws or not. If you're 
going to run for attorney general, this is part of the job,’ Cuccinelli says. ‘If you're not willing 
to do it, you ought not run.’”). 
 93. Id. 
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another way, I repudiate and denounce the early-1950s segregation laws today; but 
the very nature of the adversarial system required that in 1954 the State of Kansas 
and its statute be represented in court by competent counsel, which the Kansas 
Attorney General at that time was obligated to provide, even though his side, 
properly, lost the Brown case. 
D. Some General Conclusions about the Duty to Defend 
The Holder Doctrine for state attorneys general of selective, subjective nondefense 
of certain statutes is deeply flawed on many fronts. First, Holder’s non-binding and 
unsolicited suggestion as a federal official to state attorneys general that they refuse to 
defend state statutes “they believe are discriminatory”94 would permit attorneys general 
to resort to their own subjective opinions of the law when determining whether to 
maintain a defense. 
Second, and relatedly, Holder’s suggestion that attorneys general can refuse to 
defend statutes “that they believe to be discriminatory,”95 if taken to its logical 
conclusion, would enable attorneys general to abandon a defense in virtually any 
situation; there would be no limiting principle. Laws reflect choices made by elected 
legislators to prioritize or prefer one economic activity or course of action over 
another. Laws, by their nature, can be perceived to discriminate among people. 
Statutes that mandate a certain retirement age discriminate against the elderly.96 
These statutes may be based on poor policy choices by policy-makers in the 
legislative branch. Yet an attorney general should not abandon the duty to defend 
these statutes merely because the statute discriminates, or more precisely, codifies 
choices and decisions made by the people’s elected representatives in the legislature. 
Even if the attorney general believes the enacted version of a statute represents bad 
policy or insufficient consideration and analysis by elected politicians of another 
branch of government, viable constitutional defenses are still available in court if 
such a statute, as codified, has not previously been struck down by the highest 
appellate court, as will be explained later in this Article. 
Even Holder’s attempt to clarify his doctrine represents an inaccurate view of the 
law. He explains that any statute that infringes on citizens’ civil rights—including, 
in his view, a traditional marriage definition—is subject to the “highest level of 
scrutiny.”97 But age discrimination claims brought under the Equal Protection 
Clause, such as the claim in Murgia, are evaluated under rational basis review—the 
lowest level of scrutiny—as are Equal Protection claims based on disability.98 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. Apuzzo, supra note 5. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (holding that, although 
discriminatory, a Massachusetts statute that mandated retirement for uniformed police officers at 
fifty-years-old did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 97. Holder, supra note 1. 
 98. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that the 
protections of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment did not extend to ADA Title I because 
disability discrimination is evaluated under rational basis review); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (explaining that Fourteenth Amendment age discrimination 
equal protection claims are evaluated under rational basis); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
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Gender and legitimacy discrimination claims proceed under intermediate scrutiny.99 
Strict scrutiny, the highest level of scrutiny, is limited to Equal Protection claims 
based on race, national origin, and (in some cases) alienage.100 The most significant 
case against Holder’s argument is Romer v. Evans, where the Court applied rational 
basis review to a sexual-orientation discrimination Equal Protection claim.101 
In his recent speech mentioned above, Judge William Pryor argued that state 
attorneys general can decline to defend a challenged statute if they conclude “in good 
faith” that the statute is unconstitutional based on independent executive review.102 In 
conducting such review, he contended, attorneys general need not wait for a court to 
address the issue or defer to court opinions construing the statute or similar statutes.103 
While serving as Alabama Attorney General, however, Pryor issued four advisory 
opinions in which he articulated the duty to defend in much the same terms as 
described in this article. In these opinions, his office refused to opine on a statute’s 
constitutionality even if the statute was not currently subject to a constitutional 
challenge.104 Instead, Pryor’s office explained that the attorney general has an 
“obligation to defend [the statute’s] constitutionality, unless the law is patently 
unconstitutional.”105 Although he did not personally sign these opinions, they were 
issued under his name and, presumably, with his approval. Rather than engage in 
independent executive review, an attorney general must “defer questions on the 
constitutionality of statutes to the courts,” said Pryor.106 The attorney general must 
abstain from questioning a statute’s constitutionality because “such a determination 
does not fall within the scope of an Attorney General’s opinions[;] it is a proper 
                                                                                                                 
 
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Commentators sometimes claim that the Court applies 
a slightly higher standard—“rational basis with bite”—to Equal Protection claims involving 
disability, but there is virtually no case law to support the existence of a higher standard for 
these types of claims. Note, The Benefits of Unequal Protection, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1348, 
1363 (2013) (noting that courts have not indicated that a different standard governs, except in 
“a few rare instances”). 
 99. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (applying intermediate scrutiny to legitimacy 
discrimination); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to 
gender discrimination). 
 100. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 101. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). As with disability claims, commentators sometimes argue that 
the Court applies a higher standard to sexual orientation discrimination claims. See The 
Benefits of Unequal Protection, supra note 98, at 1363. U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence 
does not support this claim. The Court expressly applied rational basis review in Romer and 
implicitly applied rational basis in Lawrence and Windsor. See United States v. Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013); Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–32 (1996). Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 578 (2003); The Court invalidated the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in Windsor 
because the federal government had no “legitimate purpose” for the law, which is a hallmark 
of rational basis review. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. 
 102. Pryor, supra note 6. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 2000-104. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 2000-123. Then-Attorney General Pryor himself described this 
deference as a “longstanding policy of [his] Office. Id. 
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function of the courts.”107 Until the court makes such a determination, Pryor 
explained that his office must “presume[] that . . . any act that is not patently 
unconstitutional is constitutional.”108 
Changing directions in his recent speech, Pryor cited examples of scenarios where 
other state and federal executives—that is, not attorneys general—have reviewed 
legislation and deemed it unconstitutional, including presidential vetoes,109 presidential 
prosecutorial discretion and pardons,110 presidential statements regarding the scope of 
Supreme Court decisions,111 and, curiously, his own decisions to defend a law he 
deemed “silly,”112 and to prosecute former Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore for 
refusing to obey a court order to remove a Ten Commandments monument.113 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 2000-104. 
 108. Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 2000-143; Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 2001-087. 
 109. Pryor cites three Presidents who vetoed bills because they believed the bills violated 
the constitution: Washington, Madison, and Jackson each vetoed bills they believed were 
unconstitutional. Pryor, supra note 6. As Easterbrook points out, constitutional review was 
such an integral part of a decision to veto a bill that Jackson’s veto of the Bank Bill was 
controversial because he vetoed for reasons in addition to constitutional ones. Easterbrook, 
supra note 50, at 907. The examples of presidential vetoes do nothing to advance Pryor’s 
argument because, as noted previously, a President can only review a statute’s constitutionality 
de novo when Congress presents a bill for his signature or veto. 
 110. Pryor cites Jefferson’s decision not to prosecute citizens under the Sedition Act and 
to pardon those who had already been convicted. These examples also do not support 
abandoning a defense to a constitutional challenge. When Jefferson chose not to prosecute 
Sedition Act violators, he exercised prosecutorial discretion, which is an executive function 
that is entirely distinct from defending a statute against a legal challenge. Likewise, when 
Jefferson pardoned all convicted Sedition Act violators, he exercised a power specifically 
delegated to him in Article II of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2 (“[The President] shall 
have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in 
cases of impeachment.”). Had he refused to defend the Sedition Act against a citizen’s 
constitutional challenge, he would have exercised a royal prerogative power specifically 
denied him in Article II. See supra notes 37–40 (explaining that the Take Care Clause 
prohibited the President from exercising the royal prerogatives of suspension and 
dispensation). A detailed comparison of the pardon power is beyond the scope of this article. 
For purposes of this article, it is sufficient to understand that before the 1689 English Bill of 
Rights, the King possessed the prerogative to suspend laws, i.e., to make an illegal act legal, 
and pardon subjects who violated them, i.e., “free[] the guilty party from the effect of a 
violation of the law.” William F. Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional 
History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 496 (1977). Of these two prerogatives, only the second 
was given to the President. 
 111. Pryor cites Lincoln’s statement that the Dred Scott decision bound the parties to the 
litigation but not actions taken in the Lincoln Administration. Pryor, supra note 6. This 
example too does nothing to advance his argument. It is an example of an executive 
interpreting the law in order to determine how to implement the law. It is not a decision made 
in the face of a challenge to a statute’s constitutionality. 
 112. As discussed below, this example actually supports the duty to defend. See infra. 
 113. Here Pryor cites both his initial defense of the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme 
Court who placed a copy of the Ten Commandments in the Supreme Court courtroom and 
Pryor’s subsequent efforts to remove the Chief Justice from office after the Chief Justice 
refused to abide by a court order requiring the Ten Commandments’ removal. Pryor, supra 
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The central problem with Judge Pryor’s argument, however, is that it confuses the 
duties and responsibilities of government executives who are called upon to enforce 
or implement the law with the duties of those who are not policymakers but whose 
special task it is to defend the law from constitutional challenge. Judge Pryor relies 
heavily on the work of his federal judiciary colleague, Frank Easterbrook, who has 
written about the inherent responsibility of executive officials to construe and 
interpret the Constitution as it bears on the exercise of their responsibilities. But 
Easterbrook’s point was that courts are not the exclusive authorities as to the meaning 
of the constitution. To the contrary, executives, particularly those with enforcement 
authority such as the President and governors, must interpret the constitution in order 
to implement the law, properly understood.114 All government officers take an oath 
to support and defend the Constitution of the United States (and, in the case of state 
officials, their respective states). Of necessity this means that such officials must 
have some understanding of what those constitutions mean in daily practice; that is, 
they must “interpret” their governing organic documents. 
But such a responsibility is not at odds with the special role of the attorney general 
to defend duly enacted statutes where a minimal good-faith argument for doing so 
exists. Although the President and U.S. Attorney General have historically subsumed 
the duty to defend into the duty to enforce,115 the two duties originated at different 
times and in response to different threats to the rule of law. This Article takes no 
position on an executive’s duty to enforce statutes because such a duty is 
conceptually distinct from the duty to defend. 
The duty to enforce originated as a response to King James II’s attempts to assert 
an absolute prerogative to suspend or dispense with the law. English kings never 
enjoyed an absolute prerogative under the common law system; instead, that was 
traditionally a continental conception of power.116 Parliament responded by forcing 
James II to abdicate and forcing his successor, William III, to acknowledge in the 
1689 Bill of Rights that the king possessed no such prerogatives.117 One hundred 
                                                                                                                 
 
note 6. Pryor was not defending a statute’s constitutionality; instead he was defending the 
constitutionality of a state actor’s actions and subsequently prosecuting in the civil sense the 
state actor for acting against a court order. Pryor also cited decisions to abandon defense on 
appeal after a district court invalidated a statute and decisions to confess violating a federal 
statute. Id. 
 114. Easterbrook, supra note 50, at 905. Pryor relies heavily upon Judge Easterbrook’s 
article and applies the logic therein to the duty to defend even though Easterbrook’s article 
focuses on the duty to enforce and never addresses the duty to defend. 
 115. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (noting that early U.S. Attorney General 
opinions treated the duty to defend as part of the duty to enforce). 
 116. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 26 (2014) (explaining 
that the English attempted to “restore governance through and under the law” as early as the 
Middle Ages, while kingdoms on the continent retained absolute power); id. at 65–67 (noting 
that the absolute prerogative to suspend the law was based on the “canon or civil law” of 
continental Europe); see also MICHAEL BARONE, OUR FIRST REVOLUTION 229–30 (2007) 
(explaining that absolute governments had replaced representative throughout the continent, 
and that such a trend was evident during Charles II’s and James II’s reigns). James II was not 
the first King to assert the prerogative. See HAMBURGER, supra (noting that other Stewart 
monarchs such as James I and Charles II asserted the suspending prerogative). 
 117. BARONE, supra note 116 at 191–92; HAMBURGER, supra note 116 at 68–69. 
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years later, the Founders drafted the Take Care Clause to ensure that Presidents could 
never assert these same prerogatives.118 
The duty to defend was not a direct response to the prerogative tradition. Instead, 
it is best understood as a limit on an attorney general’s power to invalidate a law 
indirectly. Rather than being based directly on the anti-prerogative tradition, it is 
based on the older and broader concept, articulated by Edward Coke, that “the King 
in his own person cannot adjudge any case . . . but that [cases] ought to be determined 
and adjudged in some Court of Justice, according to the law and Custom of 
England.”119 Whereas the duty to enforce prevents the executive from exercising the 
prerogatives by not enforcing a statute, the duty to defend prevents the executive 
from exercising them by passively standing by while a court rules in favor of a 
challenger who seeks to have the law invalidated. 
Viewing the duty to defend in its historical context shows just how far afield Judge 
Pryor has gone in his remarks. Those who argue for nonenforcement seek to revive 
an absolute royal prerogative that has been eliminated for over three hundred years. 
Those, like Pryor, who argue for nondefense, seek to create a new executive 
prerogative never before asserted in the Anglo-American legal tradition. 
These distinctions underscore the lack of persuasive historical or doctrinal support for 
Judge Pryor’s position, including discretion over pardons and prosecutions. A President 
or Governor who pardons an individual exercises a prerogative specifically delegated in 
Article II of the United States Constitution or a state constitution respectively.120 An 
attorney general who refuses to defend a statute against constitutional challenge asserts a 
new prerogative analogous to, but distinct from, the absolute prerogatives of suspension 
and dispensation which were specifically denied to the President in the Take Care Clause 
and were denied to governors in state take care clauses.121 
Pryor concludes that attorneys general may decide against defending a statute based 
on the attorney general’s own view of the statute’s constitutionality, unimpeded by any 
presumptions or deference in favor of a duty to defend. Such attorney general review, 
Pryor asserts, possesses three comparative advantages over the duty to defend: 1) 
refusing to defend a statute the attorney general deems unconstitutional “better protects 
the integrity of the judicial process”; 2) refusing to defend a statute the attorney general 
deems unconstitutional “forces public officials to take the constitution seriously”; and 
3) refusing to defend a statute the attorney general deems unconstitutional allows 
attorneys general and the public to “move beyond a trivial debate about doing a job 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. See May, supra note 25, at 873; see also HAMBURGER, supra note 116 at 26 (explaining 
that Americans included prohibitions on absolute prerogatives in the Constitution). 
 119. Jim Powell, Edward Coke: Common Law Protection for Liberty, THE FREEMAN (Nov. 
1, 1997), http://fee.org/the_freeman/detail/edward-coke-common-law-protection-for-liberty. 
 120. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“[The President] shall have power to grant reprieves and 
pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.”); see, e.g., 
Ind. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“The Governor may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, after 
conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment, subject to such 
regulations as may be provided by law.”). 
 121. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see e.g., IND. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“The Governor shall take 
care that the laws are faithfully executed”); see also supra, notes 37–40, 45–46 (explaining 
that the Take Care Clause prohibited the President from exercising the royal prerogatives of 
suspension and dispensation). 
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without thought of its consequences to the more important discussion about what the 
constitution means.”122 He also claims that executive review in a divided executive 
“means that no harm comes from a state attorney general providing an independent 
perspective that a law violates the constitution.”123 
Pryor’s claim that abandonment protects the integrity of the judicial process seems 
to be a rebuke of the Obama Administration’s decision to enforce but not defend 
DOMA. According to Pryor, executives who enforce but do not defend a law, or who 
defend a law they believe should not be enforced, invite charges of collusion with the 
plaintiffs challenging the law. Instead, he asserts that a government executive should 
neither enforce nor defend a law the executive deems unconstitutional, but instead 
should leave defense for a future executive who believes the law should be both 
enforced and defended. This line of reasoning overlooks two important points. 
First, the executive branch has an opportunity to engage in de novo executive 
review when presented with a bill.124 Perhaps a successor has a contrary view and 
refuses to enforce. That too is beyond the duty described in this article, and is no 
doubt subject to its own debate over prerogative and limits. But in any event if there 
is no enforcement, the duty to defend should not arise.  And an executive so internally 
divided as to enforce a law that it refuses to defend could never hope to achieve a 
coherent understanding of the rule of law, let alone the duty to defend.   
Second, in a divided executive, the governor may enforce the statute even though 
the attorney general believes it to be unconstitutional. In that situation, if the attorney 
general opts not to defend a statute today, a court will invalidate the statute and 
foreclose a future attorney general from maintaining a defense.125 Instead, attorneys 
general best protect the integrity of the judicial process by defending all laws where 
a good-faith defense is available, regardless of their personal views. 
Pryor next asserts that executive review, as opposed to the duty to defend, “forces 
executives to take the constitution seriously” and “not be lazy in the performance of 
their duties.”126 Certainly Pryor is correct if he means that an executive is “be[ing] 
lazy in the performance of [his] duties” when the executive chooses to enforce but 
not defend a law. But so too is an executive who chooses neither to enforce nor 
defend a law or one who, like a state attorney general, has no enforcement authority 
and chooses not to defend a law. Attorneys general who defend all laws susceptible 
to good-faith supporting arguments, regardless of their personal views of 
constitutionality, are principled, not “lazy.” 
Pryor also claims that allowing attorneys general to engage in independent review 
and opt not to defend a statute allows them and the public to move beyond “the trivial 
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. Pryor, supra note 6. 
 123. According to Pryor, “[t]he judiciary can still hear an opposing argument from an 
official charged with enforcing the law and perhaps another official such as the Governor.” Id. 
For a discussion of the problems caused by another official defending a statute in the absence 
of the attorney general, see infra notes 164–165 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text (discussing the President’s ability to 
engage in de novo review upon presentment of a bill). 
 125. Pryor, supra note 6. 
 126. Pryor cites presidential signing statements as an example of executives who are lazy 
in the performance of their duties and who shift the responsibility of constitutional review to 
the courts. Pryor, supra note 6. 
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debate of doing a job without thought of consequences” and thereby ensures that both 
sides’ views can be heard in the debate.127 This is a perplexing assertion, not least 
because one significant rationale for a strong duty to defend is that the contrary view 
threatens significant negative consequences, including undermining the legislative 
process by placing the attorney general in the position of exercising a “litigation 
veto” over legislation whose constitutionality is open to debate.  Pryor’s concern 
seems fairly specific to the same-sex marriage context, where perhaps he thinks state 
attorneys general have become too concerned with the debate over duty to defend 
rather than the merits of same-sex marriage itself.128 Taken to its logical conclusion, 
this rationale would mean that the public would benefit if some attorneys general 
would defend traditional marriage and others would not, thus enabling the public to 
hear arguments both for and against the law’s constitutionality. 
But state attorneys general are not some sort of professional speech and debate 
society. They may well influence public discussions, but that is secondary to their 
role as attorneys for sovereigns, that is, the citizens of their states. Whether the topic 
is same-sex marriage or anything else, the public can hear arguments over costs, 
benefits, tradition, risk, and constitutionality from any number of perspectives. And 
if an attorney general steps up to defend the law against constitutional attack, the 
public will benefit from the courtroom debate over the law’s constitutionality. It is 
only where an attorney general refuses to defend that citizens are deprived of such 
robust debate and where—ironically, given Pryor’s stated concerns—the focus of 
debate shifts to the duty to defend rather than the constitutional merits of the law. In 
short, once a party challenges the law, the debate has moved into the court system, 
both sides are represented by counsel, and the public can best hear both sides’ 
arguments if attorneys general present arguments in favor of the law’s 
constitutionality. Otherwise, the public hears only arguments against the law. 
Professor Katherine Shaw, who also argues for a “robust nondefense power,”129 
is equally unable to provide examples to support her argument. As discussed in more 
detail later, the first case she cites to support her argument, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger,130 represents an incorrect application of the duty to defend. The 
second case she cites represents a situation in which the attorney general defends a 
statute by representing one of the two named defendants who wished to defend the 
statute.131 The third case she cites represents a narrow exception to the duty to defend 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. (noting that the current Colorado, Idaho, and Michigan Attorneys General and the 
former Virginia Attorney General have criticized fellow attorneys general for not adhering to 
the duty to defend). 
 129. Katherine Shaw, Constitutional Nondefense in the States, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 
256 (2014). 
 130. See id. at 239–40 (citing Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 
2010)). 
 131. See id. at 240–41 (citing Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Haw. 
2012)). The plaintiffs sued both the Hawaii Governor and Director of the state Department of 
Health. The Governor announced that she would not defend, but the Director of the 
Department of Health announced that she would. The Hawaii Attorney General represented 
both parties. Id. Therefore, although the attorney general represented one party who wished 
not to defend the statute, id., he satisfied his duty to defend by representing the Director of the 
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in which the Nebraska Attorney General was required to challenge a statute when 
the government official charged with enforcing the statute announced that he would 
not enforce it.132 The fourth case she cites arose in New Jersey, one of the few states 
in which the governor appoints the attorney general.133 In that case, the governor 
ordered the attorney general to decline to defend a statute for an inappropriate 
reason—because “the [g]overnor had vetoed the bill.”134 Hence, the New Jersey case 
represents both a situation that is largely unique at the state level—a unitary 
executive—and an incorrect reason for abandoning a defense. In short, although the 
four examples cited in the article highlight some differences that exist among the 
state attorneys general offices, they do not accurately illustrate a widely accepted or 
coherent understanding of the duty to defend. 
Instead of the policy-driven view espoused in the Holder Doctrine of selective, 
subjective nondefense, state and federal attorneys general have historically taken 
their duty to defend seriously, and with good reason. Refusal to defend state statutes 
against constitutional challenges violates the careful balance of powers among 
coequal branches of government,135 deprives courts of their power to determine a 
statute’s constitutionality,136 and erodes the rule of law.137 Instead, abandonment 
grants an attorney general the power to suspend laws by choosing based on policy 
preferences which statutes will be defended in court and which will not. 
1. The Duty to Defend Is Implicit in the Rule of Law and 
Nondefense Vitiates the Rule of Law 
The greatest problem posed by selective, subjective nondefense is the 
undermining of confidence in the legal system and the resulting erosion of the rule 
of law. Broad exceptions to the duty to defend vitiate the rule of law because they 
leave “the laws dependent on [the] will and pleasure” of the executive.138 At the 
federal level, failure to strictly adhere to the duty to defend does more to undermine 
the rule of law than a failure to strictly adhere to the duty to enforce. If the President 
refuses to enforce a statute, the statute will have no effect during that President’s 
administration, but future administrations will be free to enforce it.139 Although use 
of this practice will decrease the public’s faith in the stability of the laws, the practice 
will not render any particular statute permanently ineffective. Conversely, when a 
                                                                                                                 
 
Department of Health and defending the statute. 
 132. See id. at 243 (citing State ex rel. Bruning v. Gale, 817 N.W.2d 768, 773–74 (Neb. 2012)). 
 133. See Emily Myers, Qualifications, Selection and Term, in STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 17 (Emily Myers ed., 3d ed. 2013) (noting that the governor 
appoints the attorney general in only five states) [hereinafter Myers, Qualifications, Selection 
and Term]. 
 134. See Shaw, supra note 129, at 244 (discussing Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. 
Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d 478, 481–82 (D.N.J. 1998)). 
 135. See infra Part I.D.2. 
 136. See infra Part I.D.3. 
 137. See infra Part I.D.1. 
 138. See United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342). 
 139. See Levey & Klukowski, supra note 40, at 390–91 (“Consider that a President’s 
failure to enforce a federal statute has no binding effect on future Presidents . . . .”). 
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President refuses to defend a statute against a constitutional attack in court, the 
remedy often is for the court to enter a default judgment against the government and 
permanently enjoin the statute’s enforcement, which will prohibit all of the 
President’s successors from enforcing it in the future.140 
Although abandoning the duty to defend at the federal level erodes the rule of law, 
abandonment at the state level has an even more serious effect on the rule of law. In 
the unitary federal executive, the President decides whether to enforce a statute and 
thereby precipitate a conflict that would give rise to the duty to defend. The President 
oversees both the agency enforcement and legal defense arms of the executive 
branch. By virtue of the power to hire and fire cabinet officials, the President could 
instruct the U.S. Attorney General to defend a statute even if the Attorney General 
personally believes it to be unconstitutional.141 
At the state level, executive authority is divided among numerous separately elected 
executive officials. Many officials, including the governor, secretary of state, auditor, 
and treasurer, are charged with enforcing statutes.142 An attorney general is the state 
official charged with defending state statutes against constitutional challenges, and is 
often elected (or, in the case of Tennessee, selected) independently from the 
governor.143 A state attorney general who abandons the duty to defend simultaneously 
abandons the role as law officer for the state.144 In all but five states, the governor and 
other separately elected enforcement officials cannot exercise control over the attorney 
general analogous to the control exercised by the President over the U.S. Attorney 
General at the federal level.145 The enforcement agencies and the governor may both 
believe a challenged statute is constitutional but will be unable to maintain a defense if 
                                                                                                                 
 
 140. See id. at 391 (“[W]here a President’s failure to defend a statute results in the law 
being struck down by the courts as unconstitutional, the resulting precedent may tie the hands 
of future Presidents with respect to enforcement and render futile their attempts to defend the 
law in court.”). 
 141. There are significant exceptions, of course, with respect to independent agencies such 
as the FCC, FEC, FTC, FDA, SEC, and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. In those 
scenarios, it is possible that agencies may enforce constitutionally questionable statutes but 
not have the authority over the Attorney General to require defense of that enforcement. For 
that reason, some agencies have their own litigation defense authority. Elliott Karr, Essay, 
Independent Litigation Authority and Calls for the Views of the Solicitor General, 77 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1080, 1085 (2009) (explaining that many independent agencies can maintain 
their own defenses in lower courts and that the FTC and possibly the NLRB and TVA can 
maintain their own defense in the United States Supreme Court). Regardless, the problems of 
divided executive power at the federal level are far less central to the duty to defend than at 
the state level. 
 142. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 6-8.1-3-1 (2013) (requiring the Department of Revenue, 
which reports to the governor, to administer, collect, and enforce all listed taxes); IND. CODE 
§ 23-19-6-1 (Supp. 2014) (requiring the secretary of state to administer Indiana’s securities 
statutes). 
 143. See Myers, Qualifications, Selection and Term, supra note 133, at 12 (noting that 
attorneys general are elected in forty-three states). 
 144. See supra Part I.A. (detailing the development of this duty). 
 145. See Myers, Qualifications, Selection and Term, supra note 133, at 12 (explaining that 
attorneys general in five states—Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and 
Wyoming—are appointed by the governor). 
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the attorney general believes it is unconstitutional and refuses to exercise the duty to 
defend—particularly in states such as Indiana, where other government officials need 
the attorney general’s permission to represent themselves in court.146 
Given the original rationale for the role of the attorney general as a separate 
government officer, abandonment of any essential duty vitiates the rule of law. The 
role of an independent attorney general developed in part in response to executive 
(or more precisely, royal) suspension of statutes.147 The working assumption behind 
the office is that the law exists apart from executive will and prerogative.148 An 
attorney general who refuses to defend based solely on personal conclusions about 
statutory constitutionality merely substitutes one autocratic prerogative for another 
and negates the purpose of having an attorney general. 
2. Abandonment Also Violates the Separation of Powers 
An attorney general also fundamentally alters the system of checks and balances 
by abandoning the duty to defend. When arguing that abandonment violates 
separation of powers principles, most commentators focus on the overlap with 
judicial functions. An attorney general who refuses to defend a statute when good-
faith defenses exist puts himself and his subjective opinion in the place of the court. 
Once a statute is challenged in litigation, the judicial branch is the proper branch to 
determine whether an enacted statute is constitutional.149 At that point, an attorney 
general must evaluate the statute under the “clearly unconstitutional” standard and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sendak v. Marion Cnty. Superior Court, 373 N.E.2d 145, 148 
(Ind. 1978) (explaining that another party may represent the state only if the Indiana Attorney 
General consents). 
 147. See supra notes 17–27 and accompanying text (chronicling this development). 
 148. See Marshall, supra note 33, at 2456 (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. 
Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865, 867, 868 (Ky. 1974) (explaining that the state attorney general exists 
separately from the governor to ensure that the attorney general does not merely represent “the 
machinery of government”)); Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Constitutional Status & Role of the State 
Attorney General, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12 (1993). 
 149. As the Court recently noted: 
It is thus a “‘permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system’” 
that “‘the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the 
Constitution.’” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922–23 (1995) (quoting Cooper 
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958)). 
No doubt the political branches have a role in interpreting and applying the 
Constitution, but ever since Marbury this Court has remained the ultimate 
expositor of the constitutional text. As we emphasized in United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683 (1974): “In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each 
branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the 
interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others. . . . 
Many decisions of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the 
holding of Marbury that ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.’” Id. at 703 (citation omitted). 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000); Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 2001-087. 
538 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:513 
 
only abandon a defense if it fails that standard; to do otherwise infringes on the 
court’s power to determine the statute’s constitutionality.150 
At the state level, abandonment can also infringe on powers delegated to other 
executive officers, particularly those created by state constitutions. Challenges to a 
state statute fall into one of two categories: either the plaintiff is challenging how the 
state agency is enforcing the statute, which is an as-applied challenge to the statute, or 
the plaintiff is challenging the validity of the entire statute, which is a facial challenge. 
Attorneys general have a duty to defend against both. If another executive official 
is sued for enforcing a statute in a particular way, the attorney general’s job is to defend 
the official, not to make an independent evaluation. Making such an independent 
judgment undercuts the other executive official’s separate executive authority. 
Therefore, to the extent there is a role for an attorney general to determine a statute’s 
constitutionality, it must be done so as not to undercut a separate and coequal officer 
of the executive branch from carrying out his own executive functions.151 
The real question for the duty to defend arises when a party brings a facial 
challenge against a statute. To prevail, the plaintiff must not only overcome a heavy 
presumption of constitutionality152 but must also demonstrate that the statute is 
unconstitutional in all applications, under any set of facts.153 These two barriers to 
facial challenges afford significant institutional protection from judicial interference 
to officials who enforce the law. An attorney general who opts to abandon the duty 
to defend against a facial challenge—particularly when abandonment would result 
in a default judgment—forfeits these structural protections and thereby violates the 
separation of powers to a greater extent than one who abandons a defense only 
against a particular as-applied challenge. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 150. See Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 2000-104; Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 2000-123; Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 
2001-087. 
 151. A potential exception arises where different officials interpret a statute differently and 
the attorney general must choose one interpretation to advocate in court. In that situation, the 
attorney general’s role as chief legal officer for the state and his corresponding role in setting 
the state’s legal policy, compare Feeney v. Commonwealth, 366 N.E.2d 1262, 1266 (Mass. 
1977) (explaining that the attorney general, when appearing for state officers, may decide 
matters of legal policy ordinarily in the client’s purview), allow him to resolve conflicting 
interpretations even if it means undercutting one agency’s executive authority. 
 152. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (explaining that challengers must prove a 
statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 153. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Note that this standard does not 
apply to some First Amendment cases, where the overbreadth doctrine sometimes permits 
facial invalidation even where some unprotected speech is regulated. Id. at 745 (noting that 
the overbreadth doctrine occurs within “the limited context of the First Amendment”). Courts 
disagree over whether Salerno applies to abortion regulations evaluated under the Casey 
“undue-burden” standard. See Shara L. Boonshaft, Recent Decisions, The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 60 MD. L. REV. 1242, 1246 (2001) (“The Supreme Court’s 
decisions in United States v. Salerno and Planned Parenthood v. Casey changed the focus of 
abortion cases, leading lower courts to struggle further in determining whether Casey's ‘undue-
burden’ standard replaced Salerno’s ‘no set of circumstances’ test.”). 
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3. Nondefense Impairs Adversarial Hearings and the Advancement of Legal Doctrine 
The state’s attorney general, as chief law officer of the state, unquestionably has 
standing to defend a challenged statute or constitutional amendment.154 Other state 
officers may also have standing in limited situations. For example, the governor and 
other executive officers may have standing to defend a statute that their offices are 
charged with enforcing.155 Further, the House and Senate leaders may have standing 
to defend state statutes if state law allows them to do so.156 These prerogatives vary 
greatly state by state.157 Judge Pryor believes that because other officials could step 
in to defend, “no harm would result from an attorney general declining to defend.”158 
However, any standing of other officials to appear in court will be more limited than 
the state attorney general’s. For example, legislative leaders may initially have standing 
to defend a statute, but only if a state statute specifically confers standing and only so 
long as the legislators hold their leadership roles in their respective houses.159 Therefore, 
it is possible that an attorney general’s decision to abandon a defense will effectively act 
                                                                                                                 
 
 154. Scott L. Kafker & David A. Russcol, Standing at a Constitutional Divide: Redefining 
State and Federal Requirements for Initiatives after Hollingsworth v. Perry, 71 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 229, 237 (2014) (explaining that a state has standing to defend the constitutionality of a 
state statute or constitutional provision because the state suffers a cognizable injury under Article 
III when a court invalidates a state statute (citing Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 
(2013); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986))); see also Mountain States Legal Found. v. 
Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 763 (10th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he attorney general has the exclusive right to 
represent the state in actions to enforce its interests.”); Feeney, 366 N.E.2d at 1266 (noting “[t]he 
authority of the [a]ttorney [g]eneral, as chief law officer, to assume primary control over the 
conduct of litigation which involves the interests of the Commonwealth”). 
 155. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-31-101(1)(e) (West 2008) (allowing an agency of the 
executive or judicial branch to employ its own counsel when either the governor or chief 
justice determines that the attorney general has failed to provide legal services to the agency); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-5-39(3)(a) (West Supp. 2013) (requiring the attorney general to 
authorize “an arm or agency of the state or a statewide elected officer acting in his official 
capacity” to use outside counsel when the attorney general refuses to represent the state entity); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-201(4) (2013) (allowing the governor either to order the attorney 
general to represent the state or hire outside counsel to serve as litigation counsel); 71 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 732–303 (West 2012) (allowing the governor to intervene and defend a 
statute when the attorney general refuses to do so). But see IND. CODE § 4-6-5-3 (2009) 
(prohibiting any agency from hiring outside counsel “without the written consent of the 
attorney general”). 
 156. See, e.g., IND. CODE §§ 2-3-8-1 to 2-3-9-3 (2011) (allowing the Speaker of the House 
and President of the Senate to defend Indiana statutes); Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 81 (1987) 
(allowing the New Jersey Speaker of the House and Senate President to defend a state statute 
only so long as they retained their leadership positions); Planned Parenthood of Mid-Mo. & E. 
Kan., Inc. v. Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that legislators lack standing 
to defend statutes if their state’s law does not specifically grant them standing). 
 157. Myers, Status in State Government, supra note 34, at 47–49 (describing the different 
prerogatives in various states). 
 158. Pryor, supra note 6. 
 159. See Shaw, supra note 129, at 247–48 (explaining how this precise scenario occurred 
in Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (1987)). 
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as a veto by depriving a court of an adversarial hearing with two opposing sides 
presenting arguments about the provision’s constitutionality.160 
Even if another officer has standing and elects to maintain a defense, the attorney 
general’s abandonment could provide persuasive evidence that the challenged 
provision is unconstitutional.161 The District Court for the District of Columbia 
observed that the executive branch declines to defend statutes only on “exceedingly 
rare” occasions and only when it has “the weightiest of reasons,” namely, that it could 
not conceive of a defense to advance.162 Accordingly, the court categorized executive 
nondefense as “a significant circumstance” to consider when determining whether 
the statute is constitutional.163 
When an attorney general abandons the duty to defend, particularly when no other 
state entity can maintain a defense, the abandonment prevents a court from evaluating 
the statute at all. Even if another state entity chooses to maintain a defense, such a 
defense will not advance the state’s interests as effectively as an attorney general 
defense because the attorney general is the officer charged with advancing a single, 
uniform litigation policy for all state entities.164 When one office represents all 
agencies in all actions, “statutory and case law are [sic] applied more consistently,” 
which reduces the number of interagency conflicts.165 When another office defends 
a statute, that office may be more inclined to advance its interests at the expense of 
the broader state interest. 
Courts are well aware of the value that state attorneys general and their teams 
provide in cases challenging state laws. Only an attorney general, as chief legal 
officer of a sovereign whose laws are before the court, can draw on a deep reservoir 
of institutional knowledge provided by both the State’s electorate and state 
government agencies who are his clients. And as the experience of Hollingsworth in 
part demonstrates, the function of a State’s attorney general as a defender of a State’s 
laws is critical to sound resolution of core constitutional issues. It ensures not only that 
the appropriate, statewide chief legal officer has elected to make a defense,166 but also 
that the precise arguments being offered to courts have been vetted by an official who 
is subject to statewide political accountability. Perhaps as important, it also ensures that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. For a recent example of this situation, see Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 
(2013). For a more detailed discussion of the Hollingsworth opinion, see infra notes 209–83 
and accompanying text. 
 161. See Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1044 (D.D.C. 1979). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See, e.g., Indiana State Toll Bridge Comm’n v. Minor, 139 N.E.2d 445, 448 (Ind. 
1957) (explaining that the Office of the Attorney General has a duty to represent all agencies 
and harmonize the state’s legal position before the courts); State ex rel. Young v. Niblack, 99 
N.E.2d 839, 842–43 (Ind. 1951) (prohibiting the superintendent of public instruction from 
representing himself in court and instead explaining that the attorney general represents the 
state and “attend[s] to the interests of the state in all suits . . .”); Myers, Status in State 
Government, supra note 34, at 59. 
 165. Myers, Status in State Government, supra note 34, at 59. 
 166. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 (explaining that, unlike state officials, private 
entities are “free to pursue a purely ideological commitment to the law’s constitutionality 
without the need to take cognizance of resource constraints, changes in public opinion, or 
potential ramifications for other state priorities”). 
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courts are not faced with confusion over who, in fact, represents the interests of the 
State. By contrast, when an attorney general stakes out a position against his own 
State’s law before the Court, competing parties can make equally plausible claims to 
be voicing the State’s interests. If the court is to achieve a fully informed resolution of 
complex and controversial legal issues, it must have the assurance that it is hearing an 
unfettered, uncontradicted articulation of state interests from the very official charged 
by law with advocating on behalf of those interests in court. 
4. The Duty to Defend Is Not Absolute 
Of course, an attorney general’s duty to defend statutes against constitutional 
attack is not limitless. Federal and state attorneys general have not always defended 
statutes in the face of constitutional challenges. 
At the federal level, the attorney general has developed the well-accepted tradition 
of not defending statutes that erode executive power. The President has a 
constitutional duty to ensure that other branches do not encroach upon the powers 
granted to the President by the constitution.167 In the unitary federal executive, 
requiring the President to defend a statute that infringes on his powers could leave 
no party to challenge its constitutionality in court.168 By challenging instead of 
defending the statute, the President is able to protect against infringements by other 
branches those duties that have been constitutionally reserved to his office. 
At the state level, the divided executive structure largely mitigates these concerns 
because the governor or another enforcement officer could challenge a statute that 
infringes on his office’s powers while the attorney general simultaneously defends 
the statute. In that situation, the court will still be presented with arguments for and 
against the statute’s constitutionality and will be able to determine whether the statute 
is constitutional. 
Finally, there is the category of laws for which no defense is warranted because 
no good-faith argument can possibly be made for their constitutionality. There can 
be no doubt that the duty to defend can give way to unconstitutionality—but only in 
the rarest of circumstances. All authorities as to the duty to defend hold as such, albeit 
according to different standards. Some refer to the standard as the “manifestly 
invalid” standard;169 others, the “most clear and compelling circumstances” 
standard;170 the “no argument worthy of the court’s consideration” standard;171 or the 
“patently illegal or unconstitutional” standard.172 
                                                                                                                 
 
 167. Levey & Klukowski, supra note 40, at 408 (citing Recommendation that the 
Department of Justice not Defend the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the Bankr. 
Amendments & Fed. Judgeship Act of 1984, 8 Op. O.L.C. 183, 195 (1984)). 
 168. Id. (“[W]here a statute is allegedly unconstitutional precisely because it limits the 
President’s power, it will typically be only the President who can challenge the law.”). 
 169. Letter from Daniel R. McLeod to Mrs. Harold A. Moore, supra note 77. 
 170. Ariz. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 78-10 (1978). 
 171. Or. Att’y Gen. Op. No. OP-6500 n.3 (Oct. 15, 1993), available at 1993 WL 437896. 
 172. Letter from David Souter to Robert Backus, supra note 84; Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 2000-
143; Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 2001-087. 
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II. WHEN CAN DUTY TO DEFEND GIVE WAY? RULE 11 AS GUIDEPOST 
Even the strongest adherents to the duty to defend concede that, in certain cases, 
the attorney general should not defend certain statutes,173 but these situations should 
be “most rare”174 and should occur only when the statute is “‘transparently invalid’” 
or “patently illegal or unconstitutional.”175 How, then, should attorneys general 
determine whether the statute before them is one of the many that must be defended 
or one of the few that are indefensible? The most compelling answer is to tie defense 
decisions to Rule 11. 
In federal court, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 limits an attorney general’s 
advocacy by prohibiting frivolous filings that are not “warranted by existing law.”176 
State courts have corresponding rules that similarly limit an attorney general’s 
advocacy by prohibiting frivolous filings.177 Rule 11 was amended in 1983 in an 
effort to curb “abusive litigation practices [that] abounded in the federal courts.”178 
Rule 11 curbs these practices by both “streamlin[ing] the administration and 
procedure of the federal courts” and by deterring attorneys from making frivolous 
arguments.179 A frivolous argument is more than simply a losing argument; it is one 
that has no chance of success based on clearly established, binding legal precedents 
and has no chance of being extended or modified from existing precedent.180 Rule 11 
is designed to protect the adversarial system from these types—and only these 
types—of arguments.181 The proper Rule 11 inquiry is whether an unsuccessful filing 
                                                                                                                 
 
 173. See, e.g., John W. Suthers, A “Veto” Attorneys General Shouldn’t Wield, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 2, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-veto-attorneys-general-
shouldnt-wield/2014/02/02/64082fc8-887e-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html. 
 174. Representation of Congress & Congressional Interests in Court, supra note 55. 
 175. See, e.g., The Att’y Gen.’s Duty to Defend & Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable 
Legislation, 4A U.S. Op. O.L.C. 55, 56 n.1 (1980) (quoting Walker v. City of Birmingham, 
388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967); Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 2001-087; Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 2000-143; Ariz. 
Att’y Gen. Op. No. 78-10 (Jan. 26, 1978) (explaining that the office would only conclude that 
a statute was unconstitutional in “the most clear and compelling circumstances” because of 
the office’s duty to defend all statutes and because of the presumption of constitutionality); 
Or. Att’y Gen. Op. No. OP-6500 n.3 (Oct. 15, 1993), available at 1993 WL 437896 (“It is our 
duty to defend the constitutionality of a statute unless no argument worthy of the court’s 
consideration can be made in its behalf.”) (emphasis added) (citing 42 Or. Att’y Gen. Op. 377, 
380 n.2 (1982)); 53-55 Wash. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 310 (1954) (noting that statutes have a strong 
presumption of constitutionality and that the office has a duty to defend the statute “unless the 
invalidity . . . is apparent”); Letter from David Souter to Robert Backus, supra note 84. 
 176. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 
 177. E.g., ILL. S. CT. R. 137; IND. R. TRIAL P. 11(A); KY. R. CIV. P. 11; MICH. CT. R. 
2.114(D)(1)–(3); MINN. R. CIV. P. 11.02(a)–(b); OHIO R. CIV. P. 11. 
 178. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Rodriguez v. United States, 542 F.3d 704, 710 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A] frivolous 
[argument] is one that is groundless, and an argument is groundless if it is foreclosed by 
binding precedent or . . . obviously wrong.” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citing United States v. Manchester Farming P’ship, 315 F.3d 1176, 1183 (9th 
Cir. 2003))); Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 181. Mareno, 910 F.2d at 1047 (explaining that not all losing arguments are frivolous). 
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was “at least well founded.”182 Rule 11 is not, however, “intended to chill an 
attorney’s enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories.”183 
Rule 11 provides attorneys general with a useful guidepost because it provides an 
objective standard already applied in other types of cases.184 An objective standard 
will ensure that attorneys general can more easily determine whether to maintain a 
defense—either controlling precedent renders a potential defense frivolous (and 
therefore sanctionable) or it does not. 
My view is that an attorney general who can advance a defense that satisfies Rule 
11’s requirement must do so. Only by defending all laws—unless doing so would be 
frivolous—can an attorney general maintain the proper balance between the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches; provide stability in the jurisdiction’s 
laws; and ensure protection of the rule of law.185 So, if a potential nonfrivolous 
defense exists, the attorney general must raise it, even if it is a weak defense or one 
not embraced by popular opinion or other stakeholders in the political process. For 
instance, if a number of federal circuits have rejected the defense but neither the 
attorney general’s circuit nor the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed it, the defense 
may be weak and the attorney general may be unsure whether it will prevail. But the 
defense is not one for which there is no chance of prevailing based on clearly-
established, controlling precedent; thus, it is not frivolous. In this situation, the 
attorney general’s duty to defend his state’s laws controls. 
Implicit in the decision to tie enforcement decisions to Rule 11 is the caveat that 
an attorney general’s duty cannot extend to situations in which the attorney general 
must argue that the court reverse prior precedent in order to find the statute 
constitutional. For example, an attorney general could justifiably refuse to defend a 
statute that prohibited stores from displaying pornographic magazines because the 
attorney general could prevail only by convincing the U.S. Supreme Court to 
overturn its doctrine invalidating precisely such a law.186 An attorney general could 
satisfy Rule 11 only by arguing that the Supreme Court should overturn that 
precedent. To be sure, the attorney general could mount such a defense, but, as I 
conceive it, the duty to defend does not require such an effort. Instead, the attorney 
                                                                                                                 
 
 182. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 553 (1991). 
 183. Woodrum v. Woodward Cnty., 866 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Hurd v. 
Ralph’s Grocery Co., 824 F.2d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
 184. See Business Guides, Inc., 498 U.S. at 551. 
 185. When I say “defend,” what I mean to say is that when faced with a challenge to a state 
statute an attorney general must at the very least appear in court and defend the statute before 
the trial court and the court of appeals. Beyond the intermediate appellate court level, other 
considerations come into play, including the strength of that state’s particular case vis à vis 
other states’ cases addressing a similar statute, whether a pre-existing circuit court split exists, 
and whether it is clear that United States Supreme Court review is imminent. An attorney 
general must exercise special care in determining whether to appeal a case to the U.S. Supreme 
Court because, while a victory can bring favorable results to many other cases, a loss can undo 
“years of litigation progress” in the lower courts. Dan Schweitzer, The Supreme Court of the 
United States, in STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 405 (Emily 
Myers ed., 3d ed. 2013). 
 186. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972). 
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general could apply the Rule 11 standard, determine that such a defense would be 
frivolous and properly decline to defend the statute without violating the duty to defend. 
III. APPLICATION OF THE RULE 11 STANDARD TO PARTICULAR CASES 
Now I shall apply the foregoing standard to three types of cases to determine when 
an attorney general must defend a statute and when the attorney general may properly 
decline to defend it. First, this Part examines two situations in which attorneys 
general properly declined to defend their states’ statutes. This Part will then examine 
attorneys general’s decisions not to defend their states’ marriage definitions and 
conclude that such decisions are improper. 
A. Indiana’s Immigration Law Allowing Warrantless Arrests: No Duty to Defend 
In 2011 and 2012, the Office of the Indiana Attorney General was called upon to 
defend a new statute enacted by the 2011 Indiana General Assembly. The statute 
regulated the use of consular identification cards and allowed law enforcement 
officers to arrest a person without first obtaining a warrant when the officer had an 
immigration court–issued removal order, a Department of Homeland Security–
issued detainer, or notice of action.187 Section 18 “create[d] a new infraction . . . for 
any person (other than a police officer) who knowingly or intentionally offers or 
accepts a consular identification card as a valid form of identification for any 
purpose.”188 Section 20 allowed police to arrest a person “when the officer has [(1)] 
a removal order . . . for the person . . . [;] [(2)] a detainer or notice of action . . . for 
the person [issued] by the United States Department of Homeland Security 
[(“DHS”)][;] or . . . [(3)] probable cause to believe [that] the person has been indicted 
for or convicted of one or more aggravated felonies . . . .”189 
The challenged sections included a provision identical to a statute at issue in 
Arizona v. United States, which was before the U.S. Supreme Court at the time.190 
My office joined an amicus brief in support of the State of Arizona as part of the 
office’s duty to defend, but the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal law preempted 
Arizona’s registration, work application, and warrantless arrest provisions and 
permanently enjoined their enforcement.191 My office defended Indiana’s consular 
identification and warrantless arrest provisions until the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
                                                                                                                 
 
 187. SEA 590 §§ 18, 20. (codified at IND. CODE §§ 34-28-8.2 (2013), 35-33-1-1 (2011)) 
(current version at 2014 Ind. Acts 2926-27). 
 188. Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 797 F. Supp. 2d 905, 909 (S.D. Ind. 2011). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Emily Myers, Decisions Affecting the Powers and Duties of Attorneys General, 
NAAGAZETTE (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.naag.org/decisions-affecting-the-powers-and-duties
-of-state-attorneys-general1201010.php (citing Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)). 
 191. 132 S. Ct. 2492. Section 3 prohibited the “willful failure to complete or carry an alien 
registration document . . . .” Id. at 2501. Section 5(C) criminalized “an unauthorized alien to 
knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place or perform work as an employee or 
independent contractor . . . .” Id. at 2503. Section 6 stated that law enforcement “without a 
warrant, may arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to believe . . . [the person] has 
committed any public offense that makes [him] removable from the United States.” Id. at 2505. 
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Arizona v. United States. Prior to the Court’s decision, my office conducted 
discovery and filed a cross motion for summary judgment. After the Court’s decision, 
I announced that the office would no longer defend the warrantless arrest provision 
because it was clearly unconstitutional in light of the Court’s decision in Arizona; 
however, the office continued to defend the consular identification provision in the 
district court.192 In reaching my decision, I applied the Rule 11 standard and told the 
court that “warrantless arrests of persons with a removal order, notice of action, or a 
commission of an aggravated felony are unconstitutional” based on Arizona, but that 
“a federal, state, or immigration detainer justified an arrest before Indiana Code 
section 35-33-1-1, and still justifies an arrest after the Arizona decision.”193 
During litigation, three state legislators attempted to intervene to maintain their 
own defense.194 The court ultimately denied their motion to intervene because they 
did not allege an injury that would provide them with standing; instead, they “merely 
disagree[d] with” my office’s litigation strategy.195 
B. Colorado’s Law Prohibiting Public Display of Marijuana Magazines: 
No Duty to Defend 
The Office of the Colorado Attorney General declined to defend a statute that 
prohibited “marijuana-focused magazines” from being displayed in stores because 
controlling Supreme Court precedent held that such restrictions violated the First 
Amendment.196 The statute, which would force stores to conceal magazines that 
focused on marijuana-related subjects, was a content-based regulation and was 
therefore “presumptively invalid.”197 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
content-based restrictions are subject to the highest judicial scrutiny because “above 
all else, the First Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”198 The 
Colorado Attorney General applied the Rule 11 standard and decided not to defend 
the statute because “binding precedent was clear, on point, and unavoidable.”199 
                                                                                                                 
 
 192. Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:11-CV-00708-SEB-MJD, 2013 WL 1332137, 
at *1 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 2013). 
 193. Id.; see Press Release, Supreme Court Ruling Guides Final State Brief in Immigration 
Suit (July 31, 2012), available at http://www.in.gov/activecalendar/EventList.aspx
?fromdate=7/1/2012&todate=7/31/2012&display=Month&type=public&eventidn=57958&vie
w=EventDetails&information_id=116961 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s ruling in the Arizona v. U.S. 
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 195. Id. at *3. 
 196. Suthers, supra note 173. 
 197. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
 198. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 199. Suthers, supra note 173. 
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C. Traditional Marriage Laws: Duty to Defend 
In the past five years, several state attorneys general have made highly publicized 
announcements in which they abandoned their duty to defend their state’s traditional 
marriage definition. The first such instance occurred in 2008, when plaintiffs 
challenged California’s Proposition 8 in state court. Initially, California Attorney 
General Jerry Brown announced that he would fulfill his “responsibility” to defend 
Proposition 8.200 But then, when his office filed its brief, it actually argued against the 
amendment’s constitutionality, contending that the amendment “abrogate[d] 
fundamental constitutional rights without a compelling justification.”201 The California 
Supreme Court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs’ claim.202 
Then in 2009, Brown and California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger announced 
that their offices would not defend California’s constitutional marriage definition 
against a constitutional challenge in federal court because the marriage definition 
“[could] not be squared with guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”203 When the 
California state officials abandoned their defense, the amendment’s sponsors 
intervened to defend the statute.204 Following a twelve-day bench trial in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California, the court “declared Proposition 8 
unconstitutional, permanently enjoin[ed] the California officials named as defendants 
from enforcing the law, and ‘direct[ed] the official defendants that all persons under 
their control or supervision’ shall not enforce it.”205 
The California elected officials chose not to appeal the district court’s order, and 
left the amendment’s proponents to appeal.206 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit certified 
                                                                                                                 
 
 200. Shaw, supra note 129, at 238 n.118 (citing Michael Gardner & Greg Moran, Gay Marriage 
Ban Foes Take Fight to the Courts, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 6, 2008, 
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L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/18/local/me-gay
-marriage18; Letter from Edmund G. Brown Jr., Cal. Att’y Gen., and Tamar Pachter Cal. Deputy 
Attorney General, to Frederick K. Ohlrich, Clerk, Sup. Ct. of Cal. (Sept. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.kqed.org/assets/pdf/radio/brownletteropposing.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Edmund 
G. Brown Jr.]. California residents approved Proposition 8 in response to a 2008 California 
Supreme Court decision that held that the traditional definition of marriage violated the equal 
protection clause of California’s constitution. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 
(2013) (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (2008)). 
 204. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2660 (discussing the defenders); see also Letter from 
Edmund G. Brown Jr., supra note 203 (explaining why the California Attorney General’s 
Office would not appeal the lower court’s decision). 
 205. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2660 (citing Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 
921, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010)). 
 206. Id. 
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a question to the California Supreme Court asking whether the amendment’s 
proponents had standing to defend the amendment.207 After the California Supreme 
Court concluded that the proponents had standing, the Ninth Circuit addressed the 
merits of the constitutional claim and affirmed the district court’s decision.208 When 
the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the California Attorney General again 
refused to defend the amendment, this time claiming that the definition “violates the 
Constitution” and “[t]he time has come for this right to be afforded to every citizen.”209 
The Supreme Court, of course, refused to reach the merits of the case and instead 
dismissed the appeal, holding that the amendment’s sponsors did not have standing to 
appeal the federal district court’s decision invalidating the proposed amendment.210 
Hollingsworth’s procedural history is significant for two reasons. First, the Court 
dismissed the appeal for lack of standing after both the federal district court and court 
of appeals had concluded that the amendment’s proponents had standing. 
One can make the case that, rather than allowing the district court judgment to 
stand, the Supreme Court should have directed that it be vacated under the 
“exceptional circumstances” standard applicable to cases that become moot on 
appeal.211 A case must exist throughout the entire appellate review process because 
Article III requires a case or controversy for the court to have the power to decide 
the merits.212 A federal court’s power to vacate a lower court ruling, provided by 28 
U.S.C. § 2106, “clears the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties 
and eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance.”213 
At the district and appellate court levels, a live case or controversy existed between 
the amendment’s sponsors and the same sex couples, but once the Court held that the 
sponsors lacked standing, a case or controversy no longer existed. Therefore, because 
the case became moot on appeal, vacatur was the proper remedy. Had the Court 
vacated the district court’s decision, the issue would have been preserved for future 
litigation in which a party with standing might have defended Proposition 8. 
Second, because the Court never addressed the merits of the marriage definition, 
the important constitutional questions raised by the case remain unresolved on a 
consistent national basis to this day. As a result, states are continuing to debate the 
same sex marriage issue in statehouses and courthouses across the country, and other 
attorneys general have refused to defend their states’ traditional marriage definitions, 
including in Illinois, New Mexico, Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, and Kentucky.214 
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 211. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994); United States v. 
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 214. See Niraj Chokshi, Seven Attorneys General Won’t Defend Their Own State’s 
Gay-Marriage Bans, WASH. POST Feb. 20, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
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These attorneys general have announced that they would abandon their duty to 
defend at different stages of court proceedings and have offered differing reasons for 
doing so. Some attorneys general have made their announcements at the start of 
litigation. For instance, Oregon’s Attorney General announced that her office would 
not defend Oregon’s definition of marriage because it “[could] not withstand a 
federal constitutional challenge under any standard of review.”215 Pennsylvania’s 
Attorney General cited her state’s rules of professional conduct (but not Rule 11), 
explaining that she was obligated to withdraw because her belief that her state’s 
definition was “wholly unconstitutional” created a “fundamental disagreement with 
[her] client.”216 
Other attorneys general have waited until a federal district court invalidated their 
states’ marriage definitions and then refused to continue defending on appeal. For 
example, following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Windsor,217 Nevada’s Attorney General announced that she would not maintain an 
appeal because decisions issued from the U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals made “its arguments grounded upon equal protection and due 
process . . . no longer sustainable.”218 Similarly, Kentucky’s Attorney General 
announced that he would not appeal a decision striking down Kentucky’s law, 
reasoning that he “draw[s] the line at discrimination” and did not want to “regret 
[defending Kentucky’s definition] for the rest of his life.”219 
North Carolina’s attorney general initially defended his state’s definition until the 
Fourth Circuit invalidated Virginia’s definition; at that time, he announced that he 
would no longer defend North Carolina’s definition, explaining that “it is time to stop 
making arguments we will lose and instead move forward, knowing that the ultimate 
resolution will likely come from the U.S. Supreme Court.”220 
Following the 2013 election, Virginia’s new attorney general announced—during 
the middle of trial—that his office would no longer defend the state’s marriage 
definition and would instead help the plaintiffs prevail because he believed the 
definition “violate[d] the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution on two 
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grounds: marriage is a fundamental right being denied to some Virginians, and the 
ban unlawfully discriminates on the basis of both sexual orientation and gender.”221 
In his words, he wanted to be on the “right side of history and the law.”222 
In Illinois, the state’s attorney general intervened in a case against Cook County 
officials so that her office could “present the [c]ourt with arguments that explain why 
the challenged statutory provisions do not satisfy the guarantee of equality under the 
Illinois Constitution.”223 The New Mexico Attorney General also argued that the New 
Mexico Supreme Court should invalidate the state’s traditional marriage definition.224 
Some of these attorneys general nominally use the “clearly unconstitutional” 
standard.225 Other attorneys general do not even purport to apply that standard.226 But 
at best, these attorneys general are applying their own independent judgment as an 
attorney general would when asked to provide an advisory opinion.227 At worst, they 
are abandoning their duty for purely political reasons. 
The same-sex marriage cases highlight the weaknesses of the “clearly 
unconstitutional” standard and its inferiority to the Rule 11 standard. The “clearly 
unconstitutional” standard permits an attorney general to rely on personal subjective 
views of the law to a far greater extent than the Rule 11 standard. If attorneys general 
actually applied the “clearly unconstitutional” standard as strictly as attorneys 
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general had in non-same-sex marriage cases, each of these attorneys general (except 
for North Carolina’s) would have had to defend their definitions because no binding 
precedents had yet established that traditional marriage definitions are 
unconstitutional, except in the Fourth Circuit, where the Court of Appeals had 
already invalidated Virginia’s definition.228 
Under the Rule 11 standard I advocate, carrying out the duty to defend ought to 
be an easy call for a state attorney general, even if traditional marriage definitions 
run counter to one’s preferred view of policy and constitutional law. 
Marriage has existed for thousands of years, and until the past decade or so has 
always and everywhere been defined as an opposite-sex institution.229 The idea that 
either the Founding generation or the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment thought they were enshrining same-sex marriage into the Constitution 
is utterly implausible.230 Accordingly, constitutional arguments against traditional 
marriage must proceed strictly from logic rather than text or history.231 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hollingsworth, in which Prop. 8’s 
proponents claimed that the traditional marriage definition was constitutional. The 
Court’s decision to grant certiorari recognizes that the issue satisfies Rule 11 and that a 
good faith defense has been made.232 The Sixth Circuit’s recent decision upholding four 
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states’ traditional definitions further clarifies that good faith defenses exist.233 Indeed, I 
am aware of no case where a plaintiff challenging a traditional marriage definition has 
filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against an official that dared to defend such a 
definition. Such a motion would itself likely be met with Rule 11 sanctions. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DUTY TO DEFEND FOR 
ANCILLARY ATTORNEY GENERAL PRACTICES 
The preceding discussion shows that the duty to defend is vital to the rule of law 
and that an attorney general should decline to defend a statute only when defending 
would violate Rule 11. In certain circumstances, an attorney general will have to 
weigh other considerations before deciding whether to defend the statute or authorize 
outside counsel to do so. For example, the attorney general’s office may encounter a 
conflict of interest or a statute that falls outside its area of expertise.234 Or, the office 
may have previously issued an advisory opinion regarding the statute that could 
complicate its defense.235 Each scenario is discussed below. 
A. Implications for Use of Outside Counsel and Assumption of Defense 
by Other Officials 
In some cases, an attorney general will authorize outside counsel to represent the 
state, either as plaintiff or defendant. This authorization can give rise to unique 
considerations when the outside counsel must defend a state’s constitution. If the 
attorney general makes the authorization because the case falls outside of the office’s 
expertise or because a conflict of interest arises, use of outside counsel may well 
ensure that the state statute will receive a stronger defense. If, however, the attorney 
general authorizes outside counsel to avoid having to defend the state statute, the 
decision is self-defeating, because the attorney general remains accountable for the 
defense regardless of whether it is made by deputies in the office or outside lawyers 
working on contract. 
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In this regard it is important to observe how attorney general powers differ from 
state to state. In Indiana, except in very few cases, none of the attorney general’s 
client agencies may hire outside counsel without the consent of the attorney 
general.236 This distribution of power sometimes frustrates our clients, but it has the 
fundamental effect of carrying out the principal justification for having a separately 
elected attorney general: to vest one politically accountable official with the 
responsibility of determining legal policy for all (or nearly all) of state 
government.237 The main value of an independent attorney general would be 
undermined by permitting client agencies to hire their own lawyers whenever they 
disagreed with the attorney general on matters of legal policy.238 
Other states, however, authorize various state officials to exercise their own 
discretion when deciding to hire outside counsel or mount a defense apart from the 
attorney general. Such states generally limit such discretion to governors, but some 
extend it to other officials.239 Such dual control over legal policy can lead to 
confusing outcomes, such as when the Governor and Attorney General of Georgia 
disagreed over whether to pursue defense of legislative redistricting laws in the U.S. 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that both officials had authority 
over litigation decisions, and that primary responsibility would fall to the attorney 
general when they disagreed.240 In that case, the court concluded that the governor 
lacked “a clear legal right to compel the [a]ttorney [g]eneral” to take the governor’s 
desired legal action.241 
Other states limit the governor’s ability to maintain a defense. For instance, in 
Pennsylvania, where the attorney general has a statutory duty to defend “all 
statutes,”242 the governor can only maintain a defense after requesting authorization 
from the attorney general to do so and specifically setting forth his reasons for 
wanting to do so.243 If the attorney general refuses to give authorization, the governor 
may intervene as of right.244 
Even where a governor or other official besides the attorney general has authority 
to mount a defense without the attorney general, the attorney general may not be 
saved from accountability for the decision whether to defend. In order to defend a 
state statute from constitutional attack, a governor (or other official) must be a 
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suitable defendant in such a case. Both Article III and the Eleventh Amendment 
preclude plaintiffs from challenging the constitutionality of statutes by suing a 
governor (or an attorney general for that matter) who is not responsible for enforcing 
the challenged law.245 Unlike a governor, however, a state attorney general typically 
has the authority under both state and federal law to intervene in a matter to defend a 
statute’s constitutionality.246 Accordingly, state attorneys general have a role to play in 
constitutional litigation that cannot in all cases be shirked in favor of another official. 
The bottom line is that when the state is a defendant and the state statute or state 
constitution is challenged, the authority to permit an agency to hire outside counsel 
does not afford an avenue to avoid making a difficult decision regarding the duty to 
defend. Rule 11 binds outside counsel as much as an attorney general, and the 
attorney general, as chief law officer of the state, remains accountable for 
maintaining a nonfrivolous defense to the plaintiff’s lawyer’s lawsuit. 
B. Implications for the Advisory Function 
A state attorney general also has the ability to address a statute’s constitutionality 
outside of the litigation context. State attorneys general typically have the authority 
to provide a legal opinion as to a statute’s constitutionality when requested to do so 
by a client agency or official.247 The Indiana Attorney General is required to give an 
opinion on a statute’s constitutionality when requested by the Governor or either 
house of the General Assembly, but the Attorney General may exercise discretion in 
issuing such opinions to any other person or entity.248 This means that in practice, 
the Indiana Attorney General gives legal advice to his state government clients only 
and does not give private legal advice to non-clients. Properly understood, the 
attorney general’s role here is far different from the role defending a statute in 
litigation. When the legislature or an executive agency requests an opinion on a 
proposed or enacted statute’s constitutionality, an attorney general should opine as 
to the constitutionality based on independent judgment. An attorney general 
discharges his opinion duties by providing well-reasoned analysis of a statute, even 
if that analysis concludes that the bill is unconstitutional. 
While such advice may well take account of how the statute is likely to fare in 
litigation, it is different from the review that an attorney general undertakes when 
determining whether to defend a statute. Not all attorneys general agree about the proper 
moment at which the analysis changes from the well-reasoned opinion analysis to 
deferential review—whether it is the “clearly unconstitutional” standard or my Rule 11 
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standard. Some offices refuse to opine once a statute is enacted, believing that doing so 
would conflict with their duty to defend.249 Other offices continue to issue opinions until 
a statute is challenged in court.250 
Ordinarily, these two duties remain distinct and do not create conflicts. However, 
a situation can arise where an attorney general issues an opinion at a time when there 
is no pending litigation and concludes that, despite the availability of good-faith 
defenses, a statute is unconstitutional.251 If the government enforces the statute 
anyway and prompts a constitutional challenge in court, the attorney general must 
confront whether to mount a legal defense notwithstanding the earlier advisory 
opinion. Though the advisory opinion will no doubt undercut arguments made in 
court to defend that statute, the advisory opinion does not prevent the attorney 
general from making those arguments. The attorney general’s opinion, after all, did 
not invalidate the statute252 but merely educated the state client as to the weaknesses 
of the statute which allowed state policymakers to consider revising the statute 
legislatively. Moreover, enabling the judiciary to afford the statute proper review 
remains a legitimate function of the office. The awkwardness accompanying such a 
situation, however, counsels strongly against issuing an advisory opinion at all when 
a statute’s constitutionality is in doubt.253 Attorneys general typically have the power 
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legal analysis.” Id. at 160. Because there was no pending litigation at the time of the opinion, 
the Maryland Attorney General “assess[ed] the constitutionality of [the statute], indulging all 
of the presumptions in favor of, and against, the statute that a court would consider,” and 
concluded that the statute violated both the U.S. and Maryland constitutions. Id. 
 252. Sch. Dist. of E. Grand Rapids v. Kent Cnty. Tax Allocation Bd., 330 N.W.2d 7, 12 
(Mich. 1982) (“[T]he opinion of the Attorney General that a statute is unconstitutional does 
not have the force of law and certainly does not compel agreement by a governmental agency 
. . . .”); Myers & Bennett, supra note 35, at 78 (“The general rule seems to be that the recipient 
[agency] ‘is free to follow [an attorney general opinion] or not as he or she chooses.’”) (citing 
7 AM. JUR. 2d Attorney General § 11, at 4 (1997)); 7A C.J.S. Attorney General § 38 (2014) 
(explaining that an attorney general’s opinion has “no controlling authority upon the state of 
the law discussed in it”). 
 253. For examples of attorneys general who chose not to opine on a statute’s 
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not to issue advisory opinions even when their clients solicit such opinions. Careful 
discretion is required, particularly where constitutional issues are at stake.254 
An even more difficult situation arises where the attorney general concludes in a 
published opinion that a statute is unconstitutional and advises an agency not to enforce 
a statute. Bear in mind that while an opinion of this sort may reach a negative 
conclusion about the statute’s constitutionality, it does not mean that no good-faith 
arguments in support of the statute are available. It merely means that the attorney 
general has considered and rejected them for purposes of that opinion, based on 
constitutional text, history, and doctrine available at the time. Not only might good-
faith arguments to the contrary exist at the time, but also subsequent doctrinal 
developments might point the way to an even more plausible defense of the statute. If 
litigation challenging the statute arises, what should the attorney general do? 
A situation similar to this arose in 1983, when the Tennessee Attorney General 
issued an opinion concluding that various state tax exemptions violated the 
Tennessee Constitution and urged the State Board of Equalization to not enforce the 
exemptions.255 The Board, acting on the attorney general’s advice, could have 
prompted an action by a potential beneficiary of the statute to require enforcement. 
If so, the attorney general would have been called upon to defend the agency. While 
many non-merits defenses may be available, eventually the attorney general might 
have once again confronted the issue whether to defend the statute. The decision 
would be, in effect, whether to defend the statute but not the agency, or to defend the 
agency but not the statute. 
Both defending agency clients and defending statues are central to an attorney 
general’s mission, but statutory defense where good-faith arguments are available is 
the irreducible role of the Attorney General. Indeed, federal judicial procedure 
expressly provides for state intervention to defend a state statute only when a state 
attorney general undertakes that intervention.256 Many states have similar statutes or 
court rules.257 
                                                                                                                 
 
constitutionality, see Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 2000-143; Letter from Robert M. Spire, Att’y Gen., 
Neb., to Sen. Chris Beutler (Dec. 20, 1985), available at 1985 WL 168642, and 32 W. Va. Op. 
Att’y Gen. 70 (1926). 
 254. See Myers & Bennett, supra note 35, at 76 (noting situations in which it is 
inappropriate for an attorney general to issue an opinion); see also Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 2000-
143 (noting that the office declines to issue opinions about a statute’s constitutionality during 
litigation and instead presumes the statute to be constitutional unless patently 
unconstitutional); La. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 97-361 (Oct. 23, 1997) (noting the Office’s 
“policy . . . to refrain from opining whether an [sic] statute is constitutional inasmuch as the 
Attorney General is charged with defending the constitutionality of all legislative statutes”); 
letter from Robert M. Spire to Sen. Chris Beutler, supra note 253 (declining to issue an 
opinion); 32 W. Va. Op. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 70 (1926) (same). 
 255. Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 83-418 (Dec. 16, 1983). 
 256. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.1(a)(2), (c) (requiring a party challenging a state statute’s 
constitutionality to serve notice on the state attorney general and allowing the attorney general 
to intervene). 
 257. E.g., IND. CODE § 34-14-1-11 (2011) (“In any proceeding in which a statute, 
ordinance, or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the court shall certify this fact to the 
attorney general, and the attorney general shall be permitted to intervene for presentation of 
evidence, if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for arguments on the question 
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Furthermore, defending a statute implicates public accountability with respect to 
constitutional line drawing. Typically, even in a case with a statute of highly 
questionable constitutionality, a broad array of lawyers with diverse viewpoints 
would be able to formulate a variety of good-faith arguments in defense. Choosing 
among such arguments requires a lawyer to make judgments about broader 
implications for state policy, government operations, and individual rights, not to 
mention judgments about public sensibility. Such balancing of multiple, competing 
considerations calls for a formulation of legal policy that should be subject to a 
political check, and an independently elected state attorney general inherently 
provides that accountability when appearing in court and making arguments. 
Formulating the precise legal position of a client agency also calls for such 
political accountability. Yet an agency will be either a separately elected official or 
an agency that reports to one, and accordingly will have its own channels of public 
accountability regardless of attorney general representation. In the usual case the 
requirement of attorney general representation imposes an additional check on such 
clients. But when the attorney general is unable to undertake that representation, the 
client’s baseline political accountability remains. Where the attorney general 
authorizes outside counsel to defend a statute, however, no political accountability 
underlies the legal policy formulations of counsel—a highly undesirable state of 
affairs, to say the least.258 
CONCLUSION 
In short, the Holder Doctrine advocating, without support, a selective, subjective 
nondefense represents abdication of official duty. It amounts to a license to substitute 
an individual’s political will for legal responsibility. State attorneys general are 
elected for an important purpose: to represent a state’s popular sovereignty according 
to law. Accordingly, the value of independently elected attorneys general lies not in 
some imagined leeway to simply override the political decisions of elected 
representatives (and other elected officials), but in the strength to advocate according 
to law rather than politics that comes from political independence. 
Applying the Rule 11 test rather than the Holder259 Doctrine when deciding 
whether to defend a statute will greatly benefit the legal system and, more 
                                                                                                                 
 
of constitutionality.”). 
 258. This should not be taken as a general endorsement of authorizing outside counsel 
whenever an attorney general and agency client disagree over legal policy. As the preceding 
discussion mentions, attorneys general play an important role in the formulating and synthesizing 
of legal policy for all agency clients and impose an important public check on the ability of an 
agency to impose its will through the courts. Ind. State Toll Bridge Comm’n v. Minor, 139 
N.E.2d 445, 448 (Ind. 1957) (explaining that the Office of the Attorney General must harmonize 
the state’s legal position before the courts); Myers, Status in State Government, supra note 34, at 
55. The extraordinary circumstance where the attorney general, in effect, must choose between 
two clients justifies the extraordinary remedy of authorizing outside counsel. 
 259. Eric Holder announced September 25, 2014, that he would step down as United States 
Attorney General and his resignation would be effective upon the confirmation of his 
successor. Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks by Attorney General Eric Holder 
Announcing his plans to Depart the Justice Department (Sept. 25, 2014) (transcript available 
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fundamentally, the rule of law. It will allow courts to assume their proper role of 
deciding the constitutionality of state statutes and will subject the statute to the proper 
adversarial proceeding through which the statute’s challengers and defenders will be 
able to present their legal arguments without having to address questions of standing. 
It will also maintain the proper balance of powers by ensuring that the attorney general 
does not usurp a judicial function (by declaring a statute unconstitutional) or an 
executive function (by infringing on another executive officer’s ability to execute 
statutes). Finally, and most importantly, it will require the attorney general to fulfill his 
proper role as the state’s chief legal officer committed to upholding the rule of law. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-attorney-general-eric-holder-announcing-his
-plans-depart-justice-department). The premise of this law review Article is to present a 
critique of the Holder Doctrine regarding the duty to defend, a discussion applicable and 
relevant even after Mr. Holder no longer serves as U.S. Attorney General. 
